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Success Breeds Discontent: Reforming the Taxation
of Carried Interests - Forcing a Square Peg Into a
Round Hole
Matthew A. Melone*
It is the privilege of a traderin a free country, in all matters not
contrary to law, to regulate his own mode of carrying it on according to his own discretionand choice.1
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The corporate scandals that came to light at the beginning of
this decade put into sharp focus the level and composition of executive compensation. 2 Compensation practices were implicated
as contributing to oftentimes loose, if not outright fraudulent, ac* Professor of Law, Lehigh University; J.D. Univ. of Pa., C.P.A.
1. Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 El. & B1. 47, 74 (1855).
2. See David Leonhardt & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Reining in the Imperial CEO, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2002, at BU1 (reporting the views of William J. McDonough, President of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, with respect to the excesses of executive compensation).
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counting practices employed by corporations in an effort to support their stock prices. Particular opprobrium was directed to
compensatory stock option practices. 3 The resulting public disgust led to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20024 and a
long overdue revision of the accounting standards applicable to
5
share-based compensation.
Perhaps to the relief of corporate executives, attention has
shifted to the compensation of investment fund managers. Last
year, in order to rank in the top twenty-five industry earners, a
hedge fund manager needed to earn $240 million. 6 Three managers earned over $1 billion, with the top earner, James Simon, garnering $1.7 billion. 7 Although the amounts of income earned by
such managers stir populist outrage, the issue that has generated
the most impassioned attention is the taxation of such income.
The title of one internet posting on the subject, The Fund Manager
Tax Scam, succinctly captures much of the public sentiment sur8
rounding the taxation of fund managers' income.

3. See Kenneth N. Gilpen, Expert Business Panel Puts Stock Options on a List of Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at C3. Criticism of stock option and other executive
compensation practices also came from academics. See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuck et al.,
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002). Over the last several years the practice of "backdating" stock
options has come under increasing scrutiny. See David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating:
Economic Analysis and Observations on the Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.U. L. REV. 561
(2007); Laurie J. Flynn, H.P.Reaches Settlement in Backdating Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2007, at C12.
4. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18 &
28 U.S.C.).
5. In 2004, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued SHARE-BASED PAYMENT,
STATEMENT OF FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 123, which ended an over decade long
debate concerning the financial reporting treatment of compensatory stock options. See
infra note 194 and accompanying text.
6. See Jenny Anderson & Julie Creswell, Top Hedge Fund Managers Earn Over $240
Million, N.Y..TIMES, April 24, 2007 (reporting the results of the annual ranking of the earnings of hedge fund managers by Institutional Investor's Alpha magazine), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/24/business/24gedge.html. A person with income in excess
of $100 million is many times more likely to be a hedge fund manager than the chief executive officer of a public corporation. See Steven N. Kaplan & Joshua Rauh, Wall Street and
Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes? (Center for Research in
Securities
Prices,
Working
Paper
No.
615,
2007),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=931280.
7. Anderson & Creswell, supra note 6. The remarkable level of income attained by
fund managers is symptomatic of increasing income inequality across all sectors of the
economy. Based on Internal Revenue Service data for 2005 the wealthiest one percent of
taxpayers earned approximately 21.2 percent of all income while the bottom half of taxpayers earned only 12.8 percent of income. See Greg Ip, Income Inequality-Gap Widens, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 12, 2007, at A3.
8. See Dean Baker, The Fund Manager Tax Scam (Center for Economic and Policy
Research 2007), http://www.cepr.nettindex.php?option=content&task--view&id=124681tem=45.
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Fund managers receive a significant portion of their income as a
share of partnership profits. This income is derived from an interest in the partnership that returns a disproportionate amount of
income relative to the capital invested to acquire the interest. The
tax treatment of this interest-the so-called "carried interest"-is
what has generated much controversy. Under partnership tax
rules, the character of income is determined at the partnership
level. The bulk of income earned by investment funds is typically
characterized as capital gain income. 9
Partners, with few exceptions, pay tax on the income based on
its characterization at the partnership level. Consequently, a
large portion of the tax liability of fund managers is determined at
capital gain rates, presently fifteen percent-a rate that is lower
than the rates to which the incomes of many middle class taxpayers are subjected. 10 Although the tax rules that make this result
possible have been in existence for some time, the proliferation of
hedge funds and the amount of income generated by fund managers have brought it to the attention of the mainstream business
press and, more importantly, to Congress. Despite the recent turbulence in the credit markets that has caused significant losses for
many funds, it is likely that the growth of such funds will continue
largely unabated. A recent survey of pension managers indicated
that almost eighty-five percent of the surveyed managers plan to
increase their allocation of investments to alternative investments, such as hedge funds.1 Foreign investors, including sovereign entities such as China and oil-rich Middle Eastern countries,
are also seen as rich sources of new funding. 12
Critics of the tax treatment of fund managers' income assert
that the income earned by these managers is for services rendered
and, accordingly, their income should be taxed in a manner no differently than lawyers, doctors, plumbers, or other persons who
receive compensation for services. The fact that fund managers'
9. Capital gain income is generated from the sale or exchange of a capital asset. Financial instruments such as stocks, options, and bonds are capital assets in the hands of
most taxpayers. See I.R.C. §§ 1221-22 (2006).
10. The maximum tax rate applicable to capital gains is presently fifteen percent. At
relatively modest levels of income the capital gains tax rate is less than fifteen percent and,
between 2008 and 2010, may be zero. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006).
11. Pension funds plan to increase the percentage of assets held in alternative investment vehicles to twenty percent by 2010. Currently, approximately fourteen percent of
pension assets are invested in these vehicles. See Jenny Anderson, For PrivateInvestment,
The Party Isn't Over, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2007, at C1, C4 (reporting the results of survey of
fifty pension fund managers conducted by Citigroup).
12. Id. at C4.
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income is taxed in a favorable fashion is not, according to these
critics, due to any principled distinction between their earnings
and the earnings of most everyone else. Instead, in the words of
Victor Fleischer, a prominent critic of the current tax rules, a
"quirk in tax law is what allows some of the richest workers in the
13
country to pay tax on their labor at a low rate."'
Opponents of reform efforts support the current favorable tax
climate on various grounds. The returns generated by fund managers are years in the making, involve significant risks, and benefit the economy. 14 A tax increase would also make it more difficult
to fund early-stage companies and hinder entrepreneurship. 15
Moreover, the burden of higher taxes may be passed on to the
capital-providing participants in the fund, many of whom are pension plan participants, thereby reducing returns to pension plan
participants. 16 Finally, a tax increase may lead to alternative
structures, including the use of offshore funds that would mitigate, or altogether avoid, the burden of higher taxes. 17
Part I of this article provides an overview of the fund industry
and the structure of investment partnerships. Part II presents a
brief overview of the tax rules governing partnerships, contained
in Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code. In addition, Part
II describes the tax rules that apply to the receipt of property for
services in general and the specific rules applicable to the receipt
of partnership interests in exchange for services. Also discussed
are recently issued proposed regulations, that, if and when finalized, will eliminate a significant amount of the uncertainty that
currently surrounds the issuance of partnership interests for services. In Part III, proposals for reform are analyzed. These pro13. Matt Richtel, Backers Defend Their Paydays as Congress Weighs a Tax Increase,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2007, at C6 (quoting Victor Fleischer, a law professor at the University of Illinois).

14. Id. See also The Business of Making Money, THE ECONOMIST, July 7, 2007, at 68
(describing the strengths and weaknesses of private equity); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Is Private Equity Giving Hertz a Boost, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, at BUl (discussing the role of
private equity managers in leveraging Hertz and streamlining its operations).
15. Richtel, supra note 13, at C6.
16. Public and private pension funds, along with other tax exempt entities, are significant investors in various types of investment funds. See infra note 20 and accompanying
text. See also Stephen Labaton & Jenny Anderson, Pension Effect From Tax Plan is Called
Slight, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at Cl (reporting pension and tax experts testified before
Congress and opined that tax increases on hedge fund managers would have a negligible
impact on the returns received by pensioners).
17. See Alistair MacDonald, A Hedge Haven Makes Its Rules Even Lighter, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 29, 2007, at Bi (describing the light regulatory and tax regime of the English Channel
island of Jersey and the potential competition among jurisdictions in luring investment
funds).
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posals present alternative approaches for taxing the income attributable to carried interests. One proposal would impose tax, at
ordinary income rates, on the receipt of the carried interest, based
on its fair market value. Alternative proposals would tax a portion
of the income allocable to the carried interest as ordinary income,
in an amount approximating the value of the use of other partners' capital, or would tax all of the income allocable to the carried
interest as ordinary income. Part IV questions whether the carried interest is compensation-an assumption underlying all the
reform proposals.
This article posits that the current tax treatment of carried interests should remain undisturbed. I reach this conclusion without considering the previously noted arguments put forth by supporters of the current system. Frankly, the notion that an increase in taxes would prove a disincentive to fund managers is
unpersuasive when one considers the pre-tax levels of income
earned by participants in the industry. Moreover, the belief that
reforms may lead to alternative structures and increased gamesmanship are not reasons to avoid reform if such reform is the
principled course to take. Gamesmanship often follows reformsit is a Pavlovian response for tax lawyers and they are wellcompensated for it. The tax authorities should combat future
abuses and not resign themselves to inactivity.
Instead, I resist any changes in this area because the current
system accurately captures the nature of the economic relationship between the participants in the funds. The partnership form
is intended to allow persons of varying expertise and wherewithal
to pool their assets and abilities in a flexible manner with minimal
tax distraction. Alternative taxation models either violate this
spirit, or attempt to recast the economic relationship of the participants into something it is not.
I. FUND INDUSTRY
A.

General Overview

Hedge funds are actively managed pools of capital that engage
in securities, commodities, and other financial product transactions. Typically, a fund is designed to operate within a finite life
span after which it is liquidated. The universe of hedge funds includes private equity funds, venture capital funds, buyout funds,
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and quantitative funds.18 Funds are also categorized by the specific investment strategies employed by the fund, such as global
funds, market neutral funds, or sector funds. 19 Investors in these
funds are typically wealthy individuals, institutional investors
(such as university endowment funds and pension funds), other
hedge funds, or foreign investors. 20 Hedge funds limit the number
and type of investors eligible to participate in the fund in order to
avoid both the registration and reporting obligations under federal
securities law and the limitations imposed on regulated invest-

ment companies by the Investment Company Act of 1940.21
Regulated investment companies are, among other limitations,
severely constrained in their ability to use leverage, purchase securities on margin, and short sales of securities. 22 These compa18. The term "hedge fund" is often used to describe a fund that implements a particular
type of investment strategy. I use the term more broadly to describe the various types of
largely unregulated investment funds. A "hedge" refers to the holding of positions that
move in opposite directions so that a loss in one position is offset by a gain in the other
position. Hedges are often used to merely protect an existing position and not to generate
profit. However, hedges can also be used to profit if the relationship between the two offsetting positions is anomalous. The offsetting positions will be structured so that a profit
will be generated once the relationship between the positions returns to normal. Hedge
funds invest with far more variety. The term "private equity" can be used broadly to encompass all funds not subject to securities regulation. It is also used to describe funds that
purchase public companies and thus "take them private." Venture capital funds invest in
companies in various stages of development but before maturity. Buyout funds typically
invest in mature companies. Quantitative funds employ complex mathematical models to
buy and sell securities. Their models are employed to identify, and ultimately profit from,
inefficiencies in the capital markets. Long-Term Capital Management was an example of a
fund that took investment positions based on mathematical models. This fund met a highly
publicized and inglorious end. See Michael Lewis, How the Eggheads Cracked, N.Y. TIMES,
January 24, 1999 at 24. See also Philippe Jorion, Risk Management Lessons from LongTerm
Capital
Management
(Working
Paper
Series
1999),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=169449.
19. See Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, 7 U.C. DAVIS
Bus. L. J. 323, 366 (2007).
20. Based on 2003 data, pension funds, both public and private, endowments, and
foundations comprised approximately 63 percent of the investors in private equity funds.
See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO
TAX TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP OF CARRIED INTERESTS 37 (Comm. Print 2007) [hereinafter TAX TREATMENT OF CARRIED INTERESTS].

21. Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-64 (2006)). A
limited partnership interest is a "security" under the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. §
77b(a)(1) (2006). However, funds are generally exempt from registration under the limited
offering exemption or pursuant to the safe harbors under Regulation D. See id. § 77d(2); 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (1999) (providing, inter alia, exemptions for offerings limited to
accredited investors and a limited number of sophisticated investors).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-18(a), 18a-12(a)(1), 18a-12(a)(3) (2006). A regulated investment
company must maintain a ratio of net asset value to debt of at least 300%. 15 U.S.C. §§
80a-18(a) (2006). Margin debt and naked short sales are treated as debt. Naked short sales
are short sales of securities that the fund does not own as part of its portfolio. Short sales
"against the box" are short sales of securities owned by the fund. See Guidelines for the
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nies are also severely restricted in their ability to hold illiquid investments. 23 Moreover, investment management fees based on
increases in fund assets are generally prohibited for registered
investment advisers that include regulated investment companies
among their clients. 24 Prior to 1996, hedge funds avoided these
strictures by limiting the number of investors in the fund to 100.25
In 1996, funds that limited participation to qualified purchasers
became exempt from regulation provided that the number of investors in the fund totaled less than 500.26 Funds and their investors zealously seek to keep their investment positions private for

Preparation of Form N-8B-1, 37 Fed. Reg. 12,790 (June 29, 1972). Leverage limitations also
affect the ability of regulated investment companies to enter into derivative contracts that
create financial obligations. Such obligations are permitted only to the extent that assets
are segregated in an amount equal to the obligation. See Ordower, supra note 19, at 36869.
23. Open-end mutual funds stand ready to redeem their shares at net asset value and
may hold no more than fifteen percent of their portfolio in illiquid investments. 15 U.S.C. §
80a-22(e) (2006); Revisions of Guidelines to Form N-lA, Release No. 33-6927, 57 Fed. Reg.
9,828 (Mar. 20, 1992).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1) (2006). Performance-based fees determined by outperform.
ing an appropriate index are permitted, however. Id. § 80b-5(b)(2). The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 requires registration of investment advisers, a term that is broadly defined
to include any person who engages in the business of advising others as to the value of
securities or the advisability of investing in securities. Id. §§ 80b-2(a)(11), 80b-3. Investment advisers having fewer than fifteen clients, none of which is a regulated investment
company, are exempt from registration. Id. § 80b-3(a)(3). For this purpose, each fund is
treated as a single client. See 15 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1(a)(2) (2006). The Securities and
Exchange Commission issued regulations in 2004 that required all investors in a fund be
counted toward the fifteen client limit. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain
Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004). These regulations were held
invalid by the D.C. Circuit. See Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). These
regulations, if held valid, would not have affected the ability of advisers to charge performance-based fees to funds that qualified for exemption from the Investment Company Act
under 80a-3(c)(7), discussed at infra note 26 and accompanying text, because such fees are
expressly permitted by statute. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (b)(5) (2006). Incentive fees are also
permitted to be charged to qualified clients in a registered investment company. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3 (1998).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2006).
26. Id. § 80a-3(c)(7). Registration is required for funds with 500 or more investors
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See id. § 781(g). Qualified purchasers include
individuals and family owned entities that own at least $5 million in investments, entities
with $25 million or more invested, certain investment advisers, and "knowledgeable employees." Id. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A); 17 C.F.R. § 270.3c-5(a)(4) (2006). The exemption for qualified purchasers is analogous to the exemption, under Regulation D, from many securities
law requirements for sales to certain wealthy investors. The exemptions are not identical
but the principal behind such exemptions is the same. See Ordower, supra note 19, at 34143. Commodity trading is regulated by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission.
This agency enforces the Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1-27f (2006). Most hedge
funds are exempt from commodities regulation for reasons that are similar to the rationales
that underpin the exemptions provided for under the Investment Company Act of 1940. See
Ordower, supra note 19, at 330 n.46.
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various reasons, and nondisclosure agreements are commonly exe27
cuted between the funds and their investors.
2
8
Hedge funds have existed for some time. In recent years, however, they have become a major force in the investment world. The
Securities and Exchange Commission has estimated that the
number of hedge funds grew from 400 in 1992, to 6,000 in 2003.29

Amounts under the management of these funds have been estimated at more than $2 trillion, and private equity funds have, by
30
some estimates, raised $240 billion of capital in 2006 alone.
Various factors have contributed to the growth of such funds. Assets held by qualified plans, university endowments, and other
institutional investors have grown dramatically in the past generation. Developments in modern portfolio theory have emphasized the benefits of diversification and a focus on risk-adjusted
returns-benefits that have been acknowledged by the Department of Labor. 31 The long bull market in equities of the 1980s and
1990s has created a vast class of wealthy individual investors ea27. Among the reasons that funds seek to avoid such disclosures is to safeguard proprietary information and to avoid adverse publicity for the firms in which they hold positions. Funds that include public investors, such as state pension funds, may be subject to
disclosure requirements under state freedom of information act laws. See generally Steven
E. Hurdle, Jr., Comment, A Blow to Public Investing: Reforming the System of Private Equity Fund Disclosures, 53 UCLA L. REV. 239, 250-67 (2005).
28. See Douglas W. Hawes, Hedge Funds-Investment Funds for the Rich, 23 BUS. LAW.
576, 577 (1966) (indicating that hedge funds existed as early as 1949).
29. See Ordower, supra note 19, at 324 n.3 (citing IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF
HEDGE FUNDS 1 (SEC STAFF REP. 2003)).
30. The Taxation of CarriedInterests: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th
Cong. 3 (2007) [hereinafter Taxation of Carried Interests] (Statement of Peter R. Orszag,
Director
of
the
Congressional
Budget
Office,
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=8306&type=O (citing to Congressional Budget Office
figures). See also TAX TREATMENT OF CARRIED INTERESTS, supra note 20, at 31-32.
31. Modern portfolio theory emphasizes that no investment is too risky per se if that
risk is undertaken as part of a diversified portfolio and properly compensated for. See
FRANK K. REILLY & KEITH C. BROWN, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT
23-29 (8th ed. Thomson 2006); Jeffrey S. Glaser, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Risk
Valuation, JudicialInterpretation,and Market Bias, 50 BUS. LAW. 687 (1995). In 1979, the
Department of Labor allowed pension funds to invest in high risk assets as part of a diversified portfolio without running afoul of the "prudent man" standard imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000) (requiring that a fiduciary exercise "the care, skill, prudence, and diligence ... that a prudent
man . . . would use . . . . ).

In the official commentary to the promulgation of 29 C.F.R. §

2550.404a-1, the Department was
of the opinion that (1) generally, the relative riskiness of a specific investment.
. does not render such investment . . . either per se prudent or per se imprudent, and (2) the prudence of an investment decision should not be judged
without regard to the role the proposed investment... plays within an overall
plan portfolio.
44 Fed. Reg. 37,221, 37,222 (June 26, 1979).

Spring 2008

Taxation of Carried Interests

429

ger to continue their investment success. Technological developments have reduced the costs of developing and executing complex
trading strategies. The spectacular growth of the industry has put
pressure on the managers of such funds to differentiate themselves from their peers.
Domestic hedge funds are generally structured as limited partnerships or limited liability companies. 32 The partnership form
has a long history and is commonly perceived as a vehicle used by
small businesses and professional firms. 33 However, partnerships,
based on 2005 tax return data, held assets with a book value of
approximately $13.7 trillion, with almost eighty percent of those
34
assets concentrated in real estate and investment partnerships.
Structuring a fund as a partnership or limited liability company
avoids federal income taxation at the fund level and assures the
investors in the fund that the character of the fund's income,
35
gains, deductions, and losses will be retained at their level.
Moreover, these structures provide the funds with significant
flexibility in the allocation of income and allow the managers to
control the fund. 36
The partnership structure may not be desirable for hedge funds
with tax-exempt investors, such as not-for-profit organizations
and qualified plans. Such entities, while generally exempt from
37
income tax, are subject to tax on unrelated business income.
Unrelated business income is income generated by the conduct of
any trade or business that is not substantially related to the organization's tax-exempt mission. 38 Income from investment activities, such as dividends, interest, and gains from sales of securities are not considered unrelated business income.3 9 However,
32. Limited liability companies are generally taxed as partnerships for federal income
purposes. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1) (2006). An entity not otherwise classified as a
corporation may elect to be taxed as a corporation. Id. § 301.7701-3(a). These regulations,
the so-called "check the box" regulations, replaced a classification scheme that was based
on a multi-factor analysis of entities' attributes. Unless otherwise noted, any reference to
partnership nomenclature is for convenience, and the principles discussed would apply
equally to limited liability companies that are taxed as partnerships.
33. The disparate tax treatment of partnerships and corporations has existed from the
inception of the income tax. See Armando Gomez, Rationalizing the Taxation of Business
Entities, 49 TAX LAW. 285, 286-89 (1996).
34. TAXATION OF CARRIED INTERESTS, supra note 20, at 31-32.
35. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
36. For a discussion of the flexibility afforded partnerships in allocating items among
partners see infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
37. I.R.C. § 501(b) (2006).
38. Id. §§ 512(a)(1), 513(a).
39. Id. § 512(b).
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unrelated business income includes income from debt-financed
40
property which is held to produce income.
Consequently, funds that employ leverage may subject the otherwise tax-exempt investors to taxation on a portion of the funds'
income. 41 A domestic corporation, due to its taxability, is generally not a feasible alternative to the partnership form. As a result,
tax-exempt investors may gravitate toward foreign-based funds
42
that are not taxed as partnerships for United States purposes.
Foreign corporation income that is not effectively connected with a
United States trade or business is not subject to United States
tax. 43 Instead, a withholding tax is imposed on certain periodic
payments from United States sources to foreign persons and on
proceeds from the sale of United States real property interests. 44
Gains generated from securities trading are not deemed effectively
connected with a United States trade or business. 45 Moreover,
most interest is exempt from withholding. 46
Investors commit capital to the fund and, in exchange, receive
limited partnership interests. The fund manager, itself a limited
partnership or limited liability company, commits minimal capital
and serves as the general partner of the limited partnership. 4 7 In
40. Id. § 514(a)-(b).
41. Id. § 512(c).
42. Foreign based funds have been used as vehicles by which fund managers can defer
investment management fees. The deferral of such fees has been subject to criticism. Recent legislation and regulations have significantly curtailed the ability to defer fees. See
I.R.C. § 409A(a) (2006) (imposing various limitations and requirements on deferred compensation arrangements); id. § 409A(b) (providing that assets set aside in offshore trusts, or
other arrangements as defined by the I.R.S., shall be treated as transferred in connection
with the performance of services). Regulations implementing this provision have been
reserved. See Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-5 (2007). Until regulations are issued it is not clear
whether the deferral of compensation by an offshore fund that does not segregate such
compensation in trust or otherwise, is governed by § 409A(b). See infra notes 67-79 and
accompanying text for an overview of § 409A.
43. I.R.C. § 882(a) (2006).
44. The tax rate is thirty percent for nonresident alien individuals and foreign corporations with respect to periodic income. See I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 881(a) (2006). The withholding
rate is ten percent of the amount realized in the case of a disposition of a United States real
property interest. Id. § 1445(a). A United States real property interest includes interests in
mines, wells, and other natural deposits and interests in certain corporations with extensive real property holdings. Id. § 897(c).
45. Id. §§ 864(b)(2)(A)(ii), 864(b)(2)(B)(ii). A dealer in securities would be conducting a
trade or business, however.
46. Id. §§ 871(h), (i), 881(c).
47. If the fund is structured as a limited liability company, the fund manager will,
pursuant to the operating agreement, be delegated managerial power. Although all members of a member managed limited liability company have actual or apparent authority to
bind the firm to transactions with third parties, internal management authority may be
allocated among members by agreement. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence
of the Limited Liability Company, 51 BuS. LAw. 1, 19 (1995).
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exchange for managing the fund, the general partner receives an
annual management fee based on a percentage of the fund's capital. This fee is typically between one and three percent. 48 Two
percent is a commonly agreed upon fee. 49 In addition, the general
partner receives a share of future profits generated by the fund,
commonly twenty percent. This profit share is referred to as the
"carried interest." The term "two and twenty," reflecting both the
annual fee and the carried interest, is often used to refer to the
fund manager's compensation. 50 One study has found that approximately forty percent of funds generated income attributable
to the carried interest. However, this percentage rose to seventy
51
percent for older funds.
The carried interest is often likened to incentive compensation
and, as such, is intended to reduce the agency costs inherent in
the limited partnership structure by aligning the general partner's
incentives with those of the limited partners. 52 The carried interest may be structured in a number of ways and may be allocated
profits on a first dollar basis, after a predefined hurdle rate is exceeded, after the limited partners have been returned their capital, or some combination of such. The hurdle rate, often referred
to as a "preferred return," is designed to compensate the limited
partners for the use of capital. 53 For example, the partnership
agreement may provide that income of the partnership is allocated
100% to the limited partners to the extent of their capital contri48. Some fee arrangements provide for a reduction in management in later years of the
fund's existence or allow existing investors to contribute new funds that will be subject to
reduced fee or no fee at all.
49. Dow Jones & Co. estimates that approximately fifty-seven percent of private equity
managers charge a two percent fee and approximately thirty-one percent charge between
one-and-a-half and two percent. Tennille Tracy, It's the Fees, Not the Profits, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 13, 2007, at C1, C2 (citing PRIVATE EQUITY ANALYSTS TERMS AND CONDITIONS
REPORT (Dow Jones 2007)).
50. A recent study suggests that management fees generate a greater revenue than the
carried interests for the industry as a whole. Such fees generate between $10 and $11 per
$100 of capital in comparison to between $5 and $6 per $100 of capital generated by the
carried interests. Carried interests generate a greater portion of revenue in top performing
funds. See Tracy, supra note 49, at C2.
51. See TAXATION OF CARRIED INTERESTS, supranote 20, at 39.
52. A prominent scholar has criticized fund managers for their increasing emphasis on
the generation of up front fees. This emphasis has diminished the incentive alignment that
the carried interest tends to foster. See Gretchen Morgenson, It's Just a Matter of Equity,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, at BU1 (interviewing Michael C. Jensen, professor emeritus at
Harvard Business School).
53. A preferred return is not synonymous with a guaranteed payment for the use of
capital. By definition, guaranteed payments are determined without regard to the income
of the partnership. See infra note 120 and accompanying text. In contrast, preferred returns are preferential allocations of partnership income.
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butions plus a predetermined percentage of such capital contributions. Additional income of the partnership is then allocated
eighty percent to the limited partners and twenty percent to the
general partner.
Partnership allocation provisions may provide for the compounding of preferred returns and "clawback" provisions. 54 Compounding may significantly increase the preferred return in partnerships that generate the bulk of their income in later years.
"Clawback" provisions are designed to recapture income allocated
to general partners on a deal-by-deal basis that, due to the overall
return of the fund as measured at some future point, has not been
earned based on the overall performance of the fund. Excessively
high hurdle rates and compounded preferred returns may be
viewed as mechanisms for rewarding only superior performance.
However, such provisions may also lead fund managers to take
excessive risk in order to reach a level of profits that will clear the
hurdle.
Performance-based returns in the fund context should, one
would expect, be less susceptible to criticism than the ubiquitous
equity-based compensation used by investment funds' corporate
counterparts. Investors in hedge funds are sophisticated and relatively small in number and can therefore bargain on equal terms
with the general partner in matters of income entitlements. In
contrast, equity-based corporate compensation has been subject to
relentless criticism. Much of the criticism stems from the belief
that managerial compensation is not determined by optimal contracting but by managerial power and rent-seeking. A process of
arm's-length bargaining between managers and the board of directors is inherent in optimal bargaining. However, recent research
has raised significant doubts about whether such bargaining does,
in fact, describe the process of setting executive pay. Structural
defects in the corporate governance infrastructure are a significant factor that may lead to sub-optimal bargains. 55 Behavioral
54. See Victor Fleischer, The Missing PreferredReturn, 31 IOWA J. CORP. L. 77, 84-85
(2005).
55. Chief executive officers have significant influence over board members. Independent compensation committees are required in order for corporations to deduct performancebased compensation in excess of $1,000,000 per annum. See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(i)-(iii)
(2006). However, such committee members operate with the knowledge that the chief executive has influence over their membership on the board. Moreover, information asymmetries often serve as a barrier to challenge executive compensation. See Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, ManagerialPower and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 772 (2002).
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theory5 6 and the ability to camouflage rent-seeking activities also
contribute to less than optimal-at least from a shareholder's perspective--compensation arrangements. 57 Recent developments,
including the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,58 may

reduce rent-seeking behavior but are unlikely to eliminate it. 59
In the context of a fund partnership, such defects should not exist, and compensation should be set by arm's-length bargaining
between equally sophisticated parties.60 Victor Fleischer has researched the use of preferred returns in the hedge fund context
and explored why such preferred returns are common in buyout
funds but not venture capital funds. Professor Fleischer concluded
that the lack of preferred returns in venture capital funds can be
explained by unique aspects of the venture capital industry, and
not by sub-optimal bargaining, contract stickiness, or behavioral
theory. 61
B.

UnwarrantedDeferralBenefits: ConstructiveReceipt and Section 409A

The taxation of the income generated from the carried interest
has garnered the most heated criticism. According to critics of the
current tax rules, the partnership structure allows what, in substance, is compensation income for services rendered, to be deferred and then taxed at favorable capital gain rates. The criti56. Many, if not most, board members are themselves chief executives or high ranking
executives. Thus, in order to establish high benchmark levels for their own pay or simply to
justify their own pay, they have a tendency to support high levels of executive compensation. In the words of Warren Buffet, "[tihere is a tendency to put cocker spaniels on compensation committees, not Doberman pinschers." Kenneth N. Gilpin, Expert Business
Panel Puts Stock Options on a List of Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at C3 (quoting
Warren Buffet).
57. The use of independent compensation committees and compensation consultants is
useful in camouflaging rent-seeking behavior as optimal bargaining. Moreover, accounting
standards often aided in camouflaging such behavior. See generally Matthew A. Melone,
Are Compensatory Stock Options Worth Reforming, 38 GONZAGA L. REV. 535, 572-83 (2003).
58. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18 &
28 U.S.C.).
59. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 made significant changes affecting
the auditing profession in order to bolster its actual and perceived independence. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered
sections 15, 18 U.S.C.). Moreover, the Financial Accounting Standards Board has recently
required that compensatory stock options be expensed upon issuance. See infra note 194
and accompanying text.
60. A group of prominent institutional investors actually hired a consulting firm to
recommend changes in the design of fund agreements that would favor the limited partners. See Fleischer, supra note 54, at 90-91.
61. See id. at 94-109.
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cism does not end, however, with the taxation of the carried interest. The rules of partnership taxation have provided general partners with other advantages that critics claim are unwarranted.
For example, general partners have often relinquished the right
to a portion of their annual management fee in exchange for additional profits interests in the partnership, thereby deferring the
tax on such income and, most likely, converting such income into
favorably taxed capital gains. 62 More recently, the ability of fund
managers to access the public capital markets and retain the advantages of Subchapter K has come under fire-a fire stoked by
the Blackstone initial public offering. 63 An analysis of the taxation of publicly traded partnerships is beyond the scope of this
work. However, the ability to defer management fees is related to
the taxation of carried interests and, accordingly, is discussed
briefly.
The relinquishment of annual fees for additional profits interests can be adequately dealt with by the existing tax architecture.
The relinquishment of a portion of the annual fee prior to the
earning of the fee poses no particular problem. In that case, the
service provider is in the same position as if the original agreement called for a reduced fee and a greater carry. It is those situations in which the fee has already been earned-but then converted to a carried interest-that may rightly be challenged. The
doctrine of constructive receipt does not appear to deal with such
situations squarely but can certainly be expanded to encompass
64
such situations if they are deemed abusive.
Moreover, under proposed regulations, a profits interest is considered property and, consequently, it may be entirely appropriate
62. Fund managers of offshore funds have also deferred their compensation in traditional ways. Because the investors in such funds are not subject to United States taxes, the
loss of the corresponding tax deduction is irrelevant. Section 409A prevents deferral of
income through the use of offshore trusts or other offshore arrangements. Until regulations
are issued, it is not certain that traditional unfunded methods of income deferral, with the
funds left in the foreign employer's dominion and control, will be subject to the foreign
funding restriction. It would appear that leaving the funds with the employer should not,
in most cases, be tantamount to an "other arrangement" targeted by the statute. If the
funds reside in the same foreign jurisdication in which substantially all the services to
which the deferred compensation relates are performed, then the statutory restriction is
inapplicable. See I.R.C. § 409A(b)(1) (2006).
63. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
64. Income is constructively received by a taxpayer if such income is credited, set apart,
or otherwise made available so that it may drawn upon if notice to withdraw had been
given. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1979). If the management fee was not payable for some
time after the decision to convert it was made it is arguable that it was never constructively
received.
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to categorize such a transaction as a taxable exchange of property-the right to management fees-in exchange for a partnership interest. 65 Under this view of the transaction, the partnership interest would not be eligible for the liquidation value election discussed subsequently.66
Finally, it is entirely possible that such a transaction could fall
under the auspices of I.R.C. § 409A and related regulations. Enacted by the Jobs Creation Act of 2004,67 § 409A imposes a plethora of operational and design requirements on deferred compensation plans. 68 Failure to meet these requirements leads to a rather
draconian result-all deferred compensation for the current and
preceding taxable years is taxable plus interest and a twenty percent penalty. 69 Compensation is deferred if such compensation is
or may be payable in a taxable year later than the year in which
the service provider had a legally binding right to such compensation.70
If § 409A applies, the plan must meet three overall design and
operational requirements. First, the plan may not permit early
65. It can be asserted that the exchange of a claim to a management fee for a profits
interest is akin to the replacement of one unsecured promise of payment for another unsecured promise of payment and, therefore, not an appropriate realization event. The proposed regulations' treatment of a partnership interest as property weakens this argument.
See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
66. The liquidation value election, which enables the value of the partnership interest
to be determined by reference to liquidation value, assures that the value of a profits interest is zero. However, this election applies in the context of the receipt of a partnership
interest for services. In the transaction in question, the partnership interest is received,
not for services, but for relinquishment of a claim against the partnership. See infra notes
165-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the liquidation value election.
67. Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 885(a), 118 Stat. 1418 (2004). Section 409A was designed to
combat perceived abuses in the operation and design of deferred compensation plans. Particular emphasis was placed on reducing or eliminating the great deal of control recipients
of deferred compensation had over the funds and their ability to effectively shield deferred
compensation funds from creditor claims.
68. Deferred compensation plans are broadly defined to include any agreement,
method, program, or other arrangement, including those applicable to only one person, that
provides for deferral of compensation. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.409A-l(a), (c)(1) (2007). The rules
apply to all service providers including individuals, partnerships, and corporations. Id. §
1.409-1(0(1). Nonqualified deferred compensation plans must be in compliance with the
regulations for tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2008. However, the I.R.S. has
extended the deadline for documentary compliance by one year provided that the plan is
operated in accordance with the applicable rules and the plan's written provisions comply
with the rules by December 31, 2008 and are retroactive to January 1, 2008. See Notice
2007-78, 2007-41 I.R.B. 780 (Oct. 9, 2007).
69. I.R.C. § 409A(a)(1) (2006).
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-l(b)(1) (2007). Numerous exceptions are made in the regulations, including certain short-term deferrals, deferrals resulting from customary payment
arrangements, administrative impracticality, certain severance pay arrangements, and
certain stock appreciation rights and stock options. See generally id. § 1.409- 1(b)(3)-(12).
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distributions. Pursuant to this requirement, a plan may permit
distribution only upon separation from service, disability, death,
unforeseeable emergencies, change in control of the service recipient, or pursuant to a fixed schedule. 71 Second, the plan may not
permit the acceleration of benefits, except as a result of separation
of service, death, disability, change in control, or unforeseeable
emergencies.72 Lastly, deferral elections must be made within
prescribed time limits-generally by the end of the service pro73
vider's tax year immediately preceding the deferral year.
The regulations have reserved guidance on the application of §
409A to arrangements between partners and partnerships. 74 The
I.R.S. has provided limited guidance for the time being. Until additional guidance is issued, the receipt of a profits interest in connection with the performance of services that, under existing
rules, does not result in income inclusion by the service provider,
will not result in deferral of compensation. 75 Under existing rules,
most profits interests issued in exchange for services are not includible in income. 76 However, under proposed regulations, the
77
receipt of such interests would be taxable.
In the event that the relinquishment of a right to management
fees for a profits interest is deemed taxable under a constructive
receipt theory or as a constructive exchange, § 409A should not
apply because no deferral of compensation would have occurred.
Otherwise, it is arguable that § 409A would apply. If the transaction is categorized as the issuance of a profits interest in exchange
for a claim against the partnership and not in connection with the
performance of services, § 409A may apply under either current
law or the proposed regulations. It is highly unlikely that the deferral arrangement would meet either the distribution or the election requirements of § 409A. 78 Although the potential application
of § 409A to partnerships and partners as a general tax principle
71. I.R.C. § 409A(a)(2)(A) (2006).
72. Id. § 409A(a)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-3 (2007).
73. I.R.C. § 409A(a)(4)(B)(i) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-2(a)(3) (2007). Various exceptions are provided, including exceptions for performance-based compensation, commissions,
and separation pay. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-2(a)(4)-(15) (2007).
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-l(b)(7) (2007).
75. Notice 2005-1, 2005-2 I.R.B. 274, Q-7 (Jan. 10, 2005).
76. Profit interests in partnerships with a predictable income stream are not excludible
from income, nor are such interests in publicly traded partnerships or those interests that
are sold within two years of receipt. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
77. It is likely that the value of the interest will be determined to be zero because the
value of such interest may, in most cases, be determined under a liquidation approach. See
infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
78. See supranotes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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may be subject to criticism, the application of § 409A to this type
of transaction appears warranted. 79
The following section discusses the tax treatment of carried interests. A brief overview of Subchapter K is presented that highlights the distinct advantages of the partnership form and its potential for abuse. Next, the tax rules applicable to the receipt of
property in exchange for services are discussed, followed by an
analysis of the rules currently applicable to the receipt of a partnership interest in exchange for services. Finally, there follows an
analysis of recently issued proposed regulations that, in large
part, maintain the status quo with respect to the receipt of profits
interests. These proposed rules do, however, provide much needed
clarity and coordination with § 83, the provision that governs the
receipt of property in connection with services in general.
II. TAXATION OF THE CARRIED INTEREST

A.

SubchapterK: General Principles

For federal income tax purposes a partnership is not a taxpaying entity.8 0 Instead, items of partnership income, gain, deductions, and losses are passed through to the partners.8 1 The char79. The nature of the taxing scheme under Subchapter K does not lend itself to the
deferral of compensation in the sense such term has been traditionally defined. Income is
taxable to partners as it is earned. Moreover, § 409A and the regulations thereunder, with
their emphasis on legally binding rights to compensation, appear to have traditional employee and independent contractor compensation arrangements in mind. Application of
these rules may be appropriate in certain cases, such as payments to partners in a nonpartner capacity, but not as a general principle. See A.B.A. SEC. TAXATION, COMMENTS
REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 409A OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE TO
TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING PARTNERSHIPS (2005). Notice 2005-1 does state that § 409 may
apply to such payments and also to certain retirement payments governed by § 736. Notice
2005-1, 2005-2 I.R.B. 274,Q-7 (Jan. 10, 2005). Moreover, the § 409A regulations provide
detailed rules with respect to equity-based compensation arrangements but only in a corporate setting. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.409-1(b)(5) (2007). Although Notice 2005-1 states
that such rules may be analogously applied in a partnership context, much clarification is
needed. Whether equity-based compensation results in a deferral of compensation is, to a
large extent, based on the fair market valuation of the equity in question. The proposed
regulations regarding the issuance of partnership interests for services allow liquidation, as
opposed to fair market, valuation to govern the taxation of the issuance of such interests.
See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
80. I.R.C. § 701 (2006). Partnerships are responsible for employment and excise taxes.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 3401 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(d)-1(c) (1970) (stating that an employer
may be a partnership). In the event the partnership does not discharge its obligations for
such taxes the general partners may be held responsible either under general state law
principles or, if applicable, specific statutory provisions. See I.R.C. § 6672 (2006) (imposing
liability for employment taxes on certain responsible persons).
81. I.R.C. § 702(a) (2006).
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acter of the partnership's income tax items are retained at the
partner level, and any item that may have an effect on a partner's
income tax liability must be separately stated. 82 Limited liability
companies are, in general, treated as partnerships for federal income tax purposes.8 3 In this respect, the partnership is treated as
an aggregate of its partners and not as an entity distinct from
those partners. In other respects, an entity theory of partnerships
underlies the tax rules.8 4 For example, the partnership must file
a tax return, and accounting periods and methods are selected by
the partnership. Such periods and methods determine the timing
and amount of the partners' distributive share of partnership
items. 85 A partner may also deal with the partnership in a non82. See id. § 702(b) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a) (2005). For example, deductions
that are, or may be, subject to limitation at the partner level must be separately passed
through to the partner and subjected to the limitations that may exist at such level. Examples of such items include investment income, investment interest expenses, passive activity gains and losses, capital losses, charitable contributions, foreign taxes, and alternative
minimum tax adjustments and preferences. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a)(1)-(8)
(2005). Attempts to apply an aggregate theory to prevent the use of partnerships from
subverting the application of tax accounting rules often leads to administratively burdensome solutions. See, e.g., Notice 88-99, 1988-2 C.B. 422 (requiring that partnerships report
to partners their share of interest expense and capital expenditures for purposes of determining whether the partner must capitalize interest). These rules are an attempt to avoid
the interest capitalization rules by having the capital expenditures to which the capitalized
interest rules apply incurred by an entity different than that which borrows funds.
83. Limited liability companies may elect to be taxed as corporations under Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-3(a) (the so-called "check the box" regulations). Moreover, single member limited liability companies are ignored for federal income tax purposes unless such entities
elect to be taxed as corporations. All transactions of such limited liability companies are
accounted for as if transacted directly by the member. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(a),
301.7701-3(a) (2006). The validity of the "check the box" regulations was recently challenged and, in a case of first impression, the regulations were upheld by the Sixth Circuit.
See Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007). Prior to the issuance of these
regulations, the classification of an entity for tax purposes depended on a factual analysis
of the characteristics of the entity in question. See Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344
(1935); United States v. Kittner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). In response to these and
other court cases, the I.R.S. issued the so-called Kittner regulations that had a decidedly
pro-partnership bias. See Gomez, supra note 33, at 291-95 (1996). Single member limited
liability companies are treated as corporations for employment tax purposes. See Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2) (2007). Prior to the issuance of this regulation, employment tax
obligations of a single member limited liability company could be satisfied by either the
company or its owner. See Notice 99-6, 1991-1 C.B. 321.
84. This duality extends beyond the provisions of Subchapter K and permeates other
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. See generally Alfred D. Youngwood & Deborah B.
Weiss, Partnersand Partnerships-Aggregatevs. Entity Outside of Subchapter K, 48 TAX
LAW. 39 (1994).
85. See I.R.C. §§ 703, 706(b) (2006). Elections with respect to cancellation of indebtedness income, mining exploration expenditures, and foreign taxes, however, are made by the
partners. Id. § 703(b)(1)-(3). Because the tax year of the partnership determines the time
in which partners must report their share of partnership items, partnerships are limited in
their choice of tax year and generally must select a tax year by referencing the tax years of
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partner capacity and will be taxed accordingly.8 6 Moreover, the
partner's interest in the partnership is a separate asset, much like
87
a share of stock.
To the extent that a partnership is a passthrough entity, it is
quite unremarkable. Trusts, estates, S-corporations, regulated
investment companies, real estate investment trusts, real estate
mortgage investment conduits, and certain cooperatives are also
passthrough entities. 88 However, the aggregate view of partnerships manifests itself in many other respects that are unique to
partnerships and provide partnerships with distinct advantages
over other forms of doing business.
A partner's basis in her partnership interest includes her share
of partnership debt, including nonrecourse debt of the partnership.8 9 The ability to include the entity's debt in basis underpinned the use of partnerships as tax shelter vehicles. 90 The acquisition of a partnership interest may provide the acquiring
partner with the ability to adjust the basis of the assets within the
their partners. Id. § 706(b)(1)(B). But see id. § 444 (2006) (providing an election to select a
tax year that would result in a tax deferral of no more than three months).
86. See id. § 707(a).
87. A partnership interest is a capital asset and will, upon taxable disposition, result in
a capital gain or loss. Id. § 741. But see id. § 751(a) (requiring that, to the extent that the
amount realized by the transferor is attributable to certain types of assets held by the
partnership, the amount realized is not considered to be from the sale or exchange of a
capital asset).
88. The passthrough feature of these entities is accomplished in different ways. For
example, trusts, estates, regulated investment companies, real estate investment trusts,
and cooperatives attain passthrough status by virtue of distributions. S corporations are
more akin to partnerships in this respect. None of these entities enjoy blanket exemption
from income taxation, however. See generally I.R.C. §§ 641-691, 851-860, 860A-860G, 13611378, 1381-1388 (2006).
89. An increase in a partner's share of partnership liabilities is treated as a contribution of money to the partnership by the partner. Correspondingly, a decrease in a partner's
share of partnership liabilities is treated as a distribution of money by the partnership to
the partner. Id. § 752(a)-(b). Recourse liabilities are those liabilities of the partnership for
the extent that a partner or related person bears the economic risk of loss for that liability.
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(1) (2005). Recourse liabilities are allocable to those partners that
bear the risk of loss, which would typically be the general partners. Id. § 1.752-2(a). A
nonrecourse liability is a liability of the partnership for which no partner or related party
bears the economic risk of loss. Id. § 1.752-1(a)(2). These liabilities are allocated under

special rules that, in part, reflect the amount of gain that would be allocated to the partners in the event that the partnership property was sold in satisfaction of such liabilities.
See id. § 1.752-3.
90. A partner's distributive share of partnership losses may not exceed that partner's
basis in her partnership interest. I.R.C. § 704(d) (2006). Because a partner's basis includes
her share of partnership debt, a partner has a greater basis with which to absorb losses
than, for example, a shareholder in an S corporation who is subject to a similar rule but
cannot include the corporation's debt in basis. See id. §§ 752, 1366(d)(1). An S corporation
shareholder may deduct losses to the extent of her basis in the stock of the corporation and
debt owed by the corporation to the shareholder. Id. § 1366(d)(1)(B).
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partnership to reflect the price paid for such interests. 91 A partnership may distribute appreciated assets to its partners without
it, or the distributee partner, incurring gain. 92 Moreover, a partnership enjoys tremendous flexibility in allocating items of part93
nership income, gain, loss, or deduction among the partners.
The unique advantages that Subchapter K affords partnerships
have led to abuses. As a result, legislative and regulatory efforts
were undertaken to mitigate such abuses. These efforts have contributed to the inordinate complexity of Subchapter K. The ability
to allocate partnership items among the partners according to the
partnership agreement made it possible for partnerships to divorce the allocation of tax items from the economic realities of the
partners' arrangements. As a result, I.R.C. § 704(b) requires that
allocations pursuant to the partnership agreement have substantial economic effect. Otherwise, tax items will be allocated pursuant to the partners' interests in the partnership-a vague standard whose application is fact-intensive. Regulations were promulgated that created a safe harbor for determining whether partnership allocations have substantial economic effect. In order to
satisfy the safe harbor, partnerships must comply with an elaborate set of rules for the maintenance of capital accounts, adjust94
ments to which must have economic consequences.
In general, capital accounts must be maintained that reflect
contributions, distributions, and allocations of income, gain, de-

91. Id. §§ 743, 754. The adjustments to the basis of property are for the benefit of the
transferee partner only. This provision is elective and generally would not be made if the
partnership property had depreciated in value. However, if the partnership has a built-in
loss in excess of $250,000 with respect to its property then such adjustment is mandatory.
Id. §§ 743(b), (d). Investments partnerships may elect to avoid the mandatory application of
§ 743. If such an election is made then the transferee partner is disallowed her share of
losses until such share of losses exceed the loss recognized by the transferor partner on the
transfer of the interest. Id. § 743(e)(2). For this purpose, an investment partnership is a
partnership that would be classified as an investment company under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 were it not exempted under either § 3(c)(1) or § 3(c)(7) of that Act. Id.
§ 743(e)(6)(B).
92. See id. § 731.
93. The allocation of partnership tax items among the partners is determined by the
partnership agreement and, provided the allocations agreed upon have substantial economic effect, they may be allocated in any manner the partners see fit. Id. § 704(a)-(b). In
contrast, an S corporation must allocate tax items pro-rata based on shareholdings. Id. §
1366(a).
94. The capital account maintenance rules provide a safe harbor for determining
whether the partnership's allocations have economic effect. Whether such economic effect
is substantial is a separate issue that focuses on whether such allocations merely shift tax
consequences among the partners or result in transitory consequences. See Treas. Reg. §
1.704-1(b)(2)(iii) (2006).
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ductions, and losses. 9 5 Liquidation of the partnership must be in
accordance with the capital accounts, and partners must have an
obligation to restore deficits in their capital accounts. 96 These
regulations have been subject to criticism due to their complexity
and to doubts about whether they are effective. 97 Moreover, because business decisions are usually not made with liquidation in
mind, the rules' heavy emphasis on liquidation may be inappropriate for determining economic effect.g9
The ease in which property may be contributed to and distributed from a partnership without immediate tax consequences presents opportunities for taxpayers to shift unrealized appreciation
or depreciation to other partners who are in a better tax position
to recognize the income or loss inherent in contributed property.
Moreover, what may be, in substance, a sale of property could be
disguised as a contribution of property followed by a distribution
of cash or other property. To combat such possible abuses, a
plethora of detailed and, in most cases, complex rules have been

95. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv) (2006). Capital accounts are increased by the fair
market value of property contributed and decreased by the fair market value of property
distributed. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b). In certain circumstances, the partnership may
revalue partnership property to fair market value. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f).
96. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2)-(3). The failure to provide for a deficit restoration may
not be fateful if the partnership can meet an alternative test that provides for a qualified
income offset. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d). Special rules are provided for allocations attributable to partnership nonrecourse debt. Because of the nonrecourse nature of such debt the
deficit restoration provision cannot be met. In order for allocations of deductions attributable to nonrecourse debt to have economic effect the partnership agreement must provide
for a minimum gain chargeback. In effect, the regulations force losses attributable to such
debt to be charged back to the partners to whom they were allocated. See generally id. §
1.704-2.
97. Partnership agreements often contain allocation provisions that will result in capital account balances that reflect what the partners would receive upon liquidation. Under
such provisions the capital account balances do not determine liquidation entitlements.
Quite the opposite, the partners' agreement with respect to liquidation determine capital
accounts-the proverbial "tail wagging the dog." See Simon Friedman, PartnershipCapital
Accounts and their Discontents, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 791, 792 (2006) (terming such provisions as "targeting" or "tracking" allocations).
98. Reliance on liquidation value tends to ignore the time value of money. A partner
may be willing to absorb the loss in her capital account that would result from a disproportionate allocation of tax deductions even though it would reduce the amount that she would
be entitled to upon liquidation if, quite reasonably, she believed liquidation was not imminent and that future operating results would restore her capital account. Moreover, because capital accounts are revalued only upon the happening of specific events their balances may not reflect economic reality. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(O (2006). See also
Friedman, supra note 97, at 797-98. Use of liquidation values may not be desirable in circumstances where a minority or lack of marketability discount may be applicable and advantageous-family limited partnerships, for example. See Carol Ann Cantrell, Partnership Interests for Services Regs: Offer Estate Planners A 'Bona Fide" Solution, THE TAX
ADVISOR 636 (October 2005).
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enacted. 99 For example, I.R.C. § 707 and related regulations provide rules for determining when a contribution of property followed by a distribution will be treated as a sale of the property by
a partner acting in a nonpartner capacity. 100
Detailed rules are provided that attempt to prevent the shifting
of unrealized gains and losses in contributed property to other
partners. I.R.C. § 704(c)(1) requires that income, gain, deduction,
and losses with respect to contributed property be allocated among
the partners so as to take into account the variation between the
property's value and tax basis. For example, if a partner contributes an asset that, at the time of its contribution, has appreciated
in value, taxable gain upon the sale of the property will, to the
extent of the appreciation at the time of contribution, be allocated
to the partner that contributed the asset. 10 1 Similar rules apply

99. In addition to rules intended to combat specific abuses, a general anti-abuse rule
exists. If a partnership is formed or availed of in connection with a transaction a principal
purpose of which is to reduce the present value of the partners' aggregate tax liabilities
then the I.R.S. may recast the transaction to achieve tax results consistent with the intent
of Subchapter K. The choice of entity to avoid an entity level tax is consistent with the
intent of Subchapter K. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b) (1995); Treas. Reg. 1.701-2(d), Example
1 (1995). Whether general anti-abuse rules are effective and whether such rules are preferable to a literal approach to statutory interpretation has been the subject of much debate.
See generally Frank V. Battle, The Appropriatenessof Anti-Abuse Rules in the U.S. Income
Tax System, 48 TAX LAW. 801 (1995); Daniel Halperin, Are Anti-Abuse Rules Appropriate?,
48 TAX LAW. 807 (1995); Pamela Olson, Some Thought on Anti-Abuse Rules, 48 TAX LAW.
817 (1995).
100. See I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(b) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3 (1992). Contributions by one
partner coupled by distributions to another may be viewed as a disguised sale of a partnership interest by one partner to another. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-7, 69 Fed. Reg. 68,838
(Nov. 26, 2004). See also Jeffrey L. Rubinger, Proposed Regulations on Disguised Sales of
PartnershipInterests, 7 Bus. ENTITIES 6 (2005).
101. If the asset is subject to periodic cost recovery in the form of depreciation or amortization then the noncontributing partners will receive allocations based on the fair market
value of the property when contributed. If tax depreciation or amortization is insufficient to
allocate such amounts to the noncontributing partners-the so-called "ceiling rule"-the
partnership may elect to make certain special allocations to cure or remedy the effect of the
ceiling rule. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-3(b), (c), (d) (2005). See also Joel Scharfstein, An
Analysis of the Section 704(c) Regulations, 48 TAX LAw. 71, 79-85 (1994) (describing the
curative and remedial methods under the regulations). The statute also mandates that any
built-in loss attributable to contributed property may only be allocated to the contributing
partner. I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(C) (2006). This provision, added by the American Jobs Creation
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 833(a), 118 Stat. 1418 (2004), prevents the partner contributing depreciated property to a partnership from receiving a distribution of other property in liquidation of her interest and leaving the property, with its built-in loss, in the
partnership to be recognized by the other partners. Under the partnership distribution
rules the contributing partner would generally obtain a basis in the property received
greater than its value thereby allowing the contributing partner to recognize a loss also.
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under the § 704(b) regulations in situations where 1 a0 2 book
value/tax basis disparity exists but § 704(c) is inapplicable.
In general, the distribution of property in a current or liquidating distribution will not result in gain or loss to the recipient
partner or the partnership. 103 The recipient partner will receive a
tax basis in the property distributed equal to the partnership's
basis in the property distributed or the partner's basis in her
partnership interest, depending on the type of distribution that
was made. 0 4 The flexibility afforded partnerships in the distribution of property affords taxpayers opportunities to shift built-in
gains and losses among partners. This shifting may be accomplished by distributing to a partner property other than that
which was contributed by that partner or by distributing built-in
gain property to a noncontributing partner. To combat this shifting, I.R.C. §§ 704 and 737 may require gain or loss to be recognized by a partner if the distribution occurred within seven years
05
of a property contribution. 1
Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code adopts, with certain
exceptions, an aggregate theory of taxation with respect to partnerships. Partnerships have tremendous flexibility to order their
102. Section 704(c) would not be applicable, for example, if a partner contributes cash
and existing partnership property is revalued pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)
(2006). The capital account maintenance rules require that principles similar to I.R.C. §
704(c) be applied. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(g) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(6)
(2005). Generally, reverse § 704(c) allocations are performed on a property-by-property
basis. However, Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(e)(3) allows securities partnerships to make such
allocations on an aggregate basis. The I.R.S. also allows certain investment partnerships to
make aggregate reverse § 704(c) allocations. See Rev. Proc. 2007-59, 2007-40 I.R.B. 745
(Oct. 1, 2007).
103. I.R.C. § 731(a)-(b) (2006). Gain may be recognized as a result of the distribution of
certain marketable securities and gain or loss may be recognized in cases where a partner
has received more or less than her proportionate share of unrealized receivables or certain
inventory items. See id. §§ 731(c), 751(b).
104. Id. § 732.
105. Section 704(c) applies in situations where property with a built-in gain or loss at
the time of contribution is distributed to a partner other than the partner that contributed
the property. If the statutory requirements are met, gain or loss may be recognized by the
contributing partner as a result of such distribution. This provision is designed to prevent,
among other perceived abuses, the shifting of the pre-contribution gain attributable to a
property to another partner who may be in a more favorable tax position with respect to
gain recognition. See id. § 704(c)(1)(B). Section 737 is applicable upon the distribution of
property, other than the property contributed, to a partner that contributed built-in gain
property and provides for the recognition of gain, but not loss, in situations to which it
applies. This provision is designed to prevent, among other perceived abuses, the shifting
of the pre-contribution gain attributable to a property to the partners remaining in the
partnership and who may be in a more favorable tax position with respect to gain recognition. See id. § 737. These provisions, often referred to by tax practitioners as the "mixing
bowl" rules, present traps for the unwary because they apply regardless of intent and may
ensnare transactions undertaken for legitimate business purposes.
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economic affairs as they see fit. Unlike most other forms of business, partners govern their affairs contractually, through the
partnership agreement, with minimal default rules. This flexibility has, however, provided ample opportunities for tax gamesmanship, whereby transactions are undertaken that serve little economic purpose outside of tax benefits. As a result, legislative and
regulatory actions to combat such transactions have resulted in a
complex and often unwieldy set of rules that govern the taxation
of partnerships and their partners. As presently constituted, these
rules have proven to be somewhat vexing in their application to
the issuance of partnership interests in connection with the performance of services.
B.

Receipt of Propertyfor Services
1.

In General

The receipt of a partnership interest in exchange for a contribution of property to the partnership is not taxable-a result that
mirrors, in most respects, the receipt of stock in exchange for a
contribution of property to a corporation. 0 6 Unlike the receipt of
stock for services, however, the receipt of a partnership interest in
exchange for services has proven to be quite controversial despite
well-settled tax principles concerning the receipt of property in
exchange for services. 107
Pursuant to I.R.C. § 83, the receipt of property in connection
with the performance of services results in taxable compensation
income to the service provider and a corresponding compensation
deduction to the service recipient.108 The amount of income recog106. Id. §§ 721(a), 351. The partnership and corporate provisions differ in certain respects. For example, nonrecognition treatment applies in the corporate context only if the
contributing persons are in control of the corporation after the exchange. Id. § 351(a).
Control is defined as the ownership of stock possessing at least eighty percent of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock and at least eighty percent of the total number
of shares of all other classes of stock. Id. § 368(c). No such requirement exists in the partnership context. Moreover, the exchange will be taxable to the extent that the contributing
shareholder receives money or other property in the exchange. Id. § 351(b). No special
rules are applicable to partnerships in this respect, and the tax consequences incident to
the receipt of money or other property will be governed by other provisions such as those
governing distributions and disguised sales.
107. The issuance of stock to a controlling shareholder in connection with the performance of services is expressly outside the purview of § 351. Id. § 351(d)(1). Moreover, the fact
that stock is property for purposes of § 83 has never been questioned.
108. I.R.C. §§ 83(a), (h) (2006). The statute appears to categorically allow the deduction
to the service provider. However, the regulations make clear that the deduction is allowed
only to the extent the amount would be otherwise deductible under general tax principles.
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nized by the service provider is the excess of the fair market value
of the property received over the amount paid by the service provider for such property.1 0 9 The fair market value of the property
is determined at the time the service provider's rights in the property are transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever occurs earlier. 110 The time at which the property's fair market value is determined is also the time the income
is recognized and the corresponding deduction is allowed to the
service recipient."' Consequently, under the general rule of § 83,
the receipt of property subject to a vesting schedule is not recognized as income until the service provider's rights to the property
have vested. Income recognition and the concomitant deduction to
the service recipient are based on the fair market value of the
112
property at the time the service provider's rights have vested.
The deferral of income recognition to the time that any substantial risk of forfeiture has dissipated can cause post-receipt capital
appreciation in the property to be taxed as compensation income
whose timing precedes the disposition of the property in question.
For example, assume an executive receives as compensation
shares of employer stock in year one, that is subject to forfeiture if
the executive is not employed at the end of year five. 113 At the end
of year five, the executive is deemed to have received compensaTreas. Reg. § 1.83-6(a)(1), (4) (2003). In the event that the service provider performed services of a nature that have a useful life in excess of one year it is possible that the service
recipient would be unable to deduct the compensation paid. Instead, such amount would be
capitalized and deducted over time, as depreciation or amortization. In certain cases, such
as costs required to capitalize land, the amount paid would be recoverable only upon the
sale of the property. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 167, 168, 263, 263A (2006). The regulations also
require the service provider, in order to deduct the compensation payment, to meet certain
payroll reporting requirements. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(a)(2) (2003).
109. I.R.C. § 83(a) (2006). Fair market value is determined without regard to restrictions other than those which by their terms will never lapse. Id. Generally, a restriction
that allows the property recipient to sell the property only at price determined under a
formula will cause the property to be valued pursuant to that formula. Id. § 83(d)(1). Special rules apply in the event such non-lapse restrictions are cancelled. See id. § 83(d)(2).
110. Id. § 83(a)(1). Whether a substantial risk of forfeiture exists is a factual question
based on all the facts and circumstances. Subjecting the service provider's entitlement to
the property to continued employment, performance targets, and covenants not to compete
will create a substantial risk of forfeiture. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1) (2005).
111. I.R.C. §§ 83(a), (h) (2006).
112. Note that this rule could result in taxable income to the service provider despite the
fact that the service provider paid fair market value for the property at the time the property interest was received.
113. This vesting schedule is a so-called "cliff vesting" schedule. More typically, the
service provider's rights in the property will vest proportionately over the vesting period.
For example, the executive's rights to the stock may vest twenty percent per year over the
five year period. In such cases, a taxable event will occur each year for the portion of the
stock that has vested during that year.
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tion income determined by the value of the stock at the end of year
five. Consequently, substantial appreciation in the stock's value
during the vesting period can result in a significant tax burden to
114
the executive.
A service provider may, however, elect to accelerate the incidence of taxation to the time that the property is transferred, not115
withstanding the existence of a substantial risk of forfeiture.
This election has particular appeal in cases where the amount of
income that is recognizable upon receipt of the property is insignificant or substantial appreciation of the subject property is ex16
pected and ordinary income tax rates exceed capital gain rates. 1
The election will lock compensation income at an amount determined by the value of the property on the date it is received and
not the date that a substantial risk of forfeiture lapses. Future
appreciation in the value of the property will be recognized only at
the time the property is sold, and such appreciation will, most
likely, be taxed at capital gain rates.
2.

Receipt of PartnershipInterests for Services
a.

Tax Accounting Implications

With respect to partnership interests, the tax law has historically distinguished between the receipt of a capital interest and a
114. The service recipient, however, would have a corresponding tax deduction that is
likewise inflated by post-issuance appreciation. One method of alleviating the tax burden
to the service provider is to provide the service provider with a tax "gross-up." That is, the
service recipient provides additional compensation to the service provider to pay the tax.
The gross-up itself is taxable, and thus the amount of the gross-up will exceed the tax due
on the compensation income generated by the receipt of the property. The gross-up amount
necessary to meet the service provider's tax obligation completely is determined by dividing
the pre-tax compensation subject to the gross-up by the reciprocal of the employee's tax
rate. For example, the gross-up required to fully cover the tax on $100,000 of income, assuming a forty percent tax rate is $66,666.66 ($100,000/60%). Gross-ups are used in a
variety of settings and have been subject to some harsh criticism. See Nanette Byrnes &
Jane Sasseen, Board of Hard Knocks: Activist shareholders,tougher rules, and anger over
CEO pay have put directors on the hot seat, Bus. WEEK ONLINE (Sept. 17, 2007),
http://www.businessweek.com/managing/content/sep2007/ca20070914_O78809.htm;
Mark
Maremont, Latest Twist in Corporate Pay: Tax-Free Income for Executives, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 22, 2005, at Al.
115. I.R.C. § 83(b) (2006). This election also accelerates the timing of the service recipient's deduction. See id. § 83(h).
116. Section 83 applies to any property transferred in connection with the performance
of service, including the transfer of property for which the service provider paid fair market
value. Consequently, if property, for example, restricted stock, is purchased at its fair market value, the stock recipient, absent an I.R.C. § 83(b) election, will be taxable on the
amount that the stock has appreciated at the time the restrictions lapse. See Alves v.
Comm'r, 734 F.2d 478, 479 (9th Cir. 1984).
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profit interest, with the former interest clearly subject to tax. 117
This distinction is underpinned by the application of a hypothetical liquidation of the partnership. If, at the time the partnership
interest is received, the recipient partner would be entitled to a
portion of the partnership assets upon liquidation of the partnership, then the interest in question is a capital interest. Otherwise,
it is a profits interest. 118 This distinction can be traced, in part, to
the promulgation of Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) in 1956.119 This
regulation provides that:
Normally, under local law, each partner is entitled to be repaid his contributions of money or other property to the partnership .... To the extent that any of the partners gives up
any part of his right to be repaid his contributions (as distinguished from a share in partnershipprofits) in favor of another partner as compensation for services . . . section 721
does not apply. The value of an interest in such partnership
capital so transferred to a partner as compensation for services constitutes income to the partner under section 61. The
receipt of a capital interest in a partnership in exchange for
117. See, e.g., United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964). Proposed regulations issued in 1971 expressly made the transfer of partnership capital interests for services subject to I.R.C. § 83. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1)(i), 36 Fed. Reg. 10,787
(June 3, 1971). Some commentators believed that the partnership itself may recognize gain
or loss on the issuance of a capital interest for services. See 1 WILLIAM S. MCKEE, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 5.08[2][b] (2d. ed. 1990); Barksdale Hortenstine & Thomas W. Ford Jr., Receipt of a PartnershipInterest for Services: A Controversy
That Will Not Die, 65 TAXES 880, 880-81 (1987). In general, the partnership is deemed to
have sold a portion of its assets, corresponding to the capital interest issued, at fair market
value. This position necessarily adopts an aggregate view of partnerships and has been
rejected by the proposed regulations. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
118. Liquidation of the partnership plays a prominent role in the allocation of partnership items, including profits and losses, among the partners. Partnership allocations are
generally determined contractually via the partnership agreement. I.R.C. § 704(a) (2006).
In an effort to prevent allocations that are motivated by tax consequences, but lack economic substance, the partnership's allocation provisions must have substantial economic
effect. Id. § 704(b). Regulations issued pursuant to § 704(b) provide a safe harbor that
insure partnership allocations will be deemed to have substantial economic effect. In general, the safe harbor requires the maintenance of capital accounts that reflect allocations of
income and loss. Moreover, these capital accounts must determine the partners' share of
liquidation proceeds. In effect, the regulations require that allocations of income to a partner come with a concomitant increase in that partner's share of partnership assets upon
liquidation. Conversely, allocations of losses to a partner come with a concomitant decrease
in that partner's share of partnership assets upon liquidation. See generally Treas. Reg. §
1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(1)-(2) (2006).
119. Case law existed prior to the promulgation of the regulation that held that the
receipt of a capital interest by shifting capital from existing partners to a service providing
partner was a taxable transaction. See, e.g., United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.
1964); Lehman v. Comm'r, 19 T.C. 659 (1953).
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services is taxable to the recipient. The amount of such income is the fair market value of the interest in capital so

transferred....

120

Although this regulation interprets a statute that deals with the
nonrecognition of income upon contributions of property to partnerships, it has been used more broadly to justify the nontaxability of the receipt of a profits interest for services. 12 1 Taxing
profits interests upon receipt raises a host of analytical and practical issues. Valuation of a future interest in profits may prove
difficult, and many such interests may have no more than speculative value. Moreover, even if one concedes that valuation obstacles
are surmountable, it is not clear how the transferee partner and
transferor partnership should account for such transactions.
The profits interest will generate income to the recipient partner when such income is earned by the partnership and allocated
120. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (as amended 1996) (emphasis provided). This regulation
provides rules similar to those contained in § 83 with respect to the timing of the income
recognition in the event the retention of the capital interest is conditioned upon the rendering of future services. Id. If the services have been, or will be, rendered to the partnership,
then the partnership deducts the value of the capital interest as a guaranteed payment for
services pursuant to § 707(c). Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(2) (1996). Section 83 explicitly coordinates the timing of income recognition and the corresponding compensation deduction.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b) does not. Recently
issued proposed regulations clarify that the timing rules of § 83 are to apply. See infra note
168 and accompanying text. If the services have been, or will be, rendered to a partner,
then no compensation deduction is available to the partnership. Instead, the partner that
is the recipient of such services will determine its deductibility under general principles.
Id. Guaranteed payments to partners are those payments made to a partner acting in his
capacity as a partner that are determined without regard to partnership income. Such
payments are made for services or for the use of capital. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(c) (1983).
Such payments are deductible by the partnership and generate income to the recipient.
The treatment of guaranteed payments is an example of the application of the entity theory
of partnership taxation, albeit an imperfect one.
Despite the fact that such payments are treated as payments made to someone other than a
partner, the timing of income recognition to the partner follows general partnership timing
rules and such payments do not trigger payroll reporting and withholding obligations. See
id. Such payments do, however, have significant effects in the application of the passive
activity loss rules. Certain taxpayers, principally individuals and closely-held corporations,
may not offset income from non-passive activities by losses generated by passive activities.
See generally I.R.C. § 469 (2006). Guaranteed payments to partners for services or for the
use of capital are treated as non-passive regardless of whether the payor partnership's
activities are passive activities. See Treas. Reg. § 1.469-2(e)(2)(ii) (1993). Guaranteed payments that are unreasonably high may trigger the application of the disguised sales rules
of I.R.C. § 707(a)(2). See Treas. Reg. § 1.707-4(a) (1992). Proposed regulations make explicit the applicability of I.R.C. § 83 to partnership interests received in exchange for services. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
121. See Laura E. Cunningham, Taxing PartnershipInterests Exchangedfor Services, 47
TAX L. REV. 247, 261 (1991) (citing MCKEE, supra note 117; ARTHUR B. WILLIS,
PARTNERSHIP TAxATION (4th ed. 1991)).
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to the partner under general Subchapter K principles. The taxation of the profits interest upon receipt will cause the recipient
partner to be taxed twice on the income absent some mechanism
that will allow the partner to reduce his allocations of future taxable income by the amount of income recognized upon the receipt
of the interest. 122
The transaction may be characterized in a manner that mitigates this problem. The transfer of a profits interest can be
viewed as the transfer of an interest in future income by the partnership to the partner who, in turn, recontributes the interest to
the partnership. This characterization would result in the partnership having a tax basis in the contributed right to future income, which, when amortized, would be allocated to the service
partner thereby mitigating the double income problem. The partnership, in turn, would recognize income on the transfer of the
appreciated property-the right to future income-and be entitled
to a compensation deduction. Unfortunately, neither general tax
rules nor the present architecture of Subchapter K supports such
a result.123 Characterizing the transaction in another fashion may
lead to distortions of income and capital accounts as the following
example illustrates.
Assume that Partnership AB has two equal general partners, A
and B, and the partnership grants C a vested thirty percent interest in future profits for services that C will render to the partnership in a partner capacity. At the time of the grant, the tax basis
of the partnership's assets is $2,000 and A and B have tax basis
capital of $1,000 each. The fair market value of the partnership's
assets at the time of the grant is $3,000. Assume that the fair
market value of the profits interest is determined to be $500 at the
time of grant. If the receipt of the profits interest is taxable upon
receipt, C will recognize $500 of compensation income, and the
partnership will have a deduction of $500. Under current law, it is
122. The service partner would obtain a basis in the partnership interest equal to the
amount of income recognized by the partner upon the receipt of the interest. Future allocations of income will result in a further increase in basis. In the absence of some mechanism
that would prevent the double taxation of income the partner will, in most cases, recover
his tax basis upon disposition of the interest. Therefore, the problem of double taxation is,
generally, temporal, not permanent.
123. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(b) provides that the transfer of property in connection with the
performance of services is a taxable event to the transferor except as provided in § 1032.
Section 1032 provides nonrecognition treatment for corporations in dealings with their own
stock. It is arguable that the transferor partnership is taxable on the transfer of a partnership interest for services. Recently issued proposed regulations explicitly reject this approach. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
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also possible that the partnership is deemed to have exchanged an
asset-the right to future income-and that such an exchange
produces $500 of income to the partnership. 124 C, in turn, is
deemed to recontribute the same asset to the partnership.
After the transaction is consummated, the tax basis of the partnership's assets is $2,500, which reflects the contribution by C of
the interest in future profits. The tax basis capital accounts of the
partners would be $1,000, $1,000, and $500 for A, B, and C respectively. 125 The book capital accounts of the partners are revalued
to reflect their fair market value. 126
At this point, the tax accounting requires some contortions to
make sense. One must assume that the carving out of a profits
interest does not affect the overall fair market value of the partnership's assets because such fair value should already include the
assets' earning potential. 127 Consequently, the partnership's assets are worth $3000, the amount they were worth prior to the
grant of the profits interest to C. Under the capital account maintenance rules, C's capital account should reflect the value of the
property he contributed. 128 C's book capital account should be
credited with $500. That leaves $2,500 to be allocated between A
and B, resulting in book capital accounts of $1,250 for each of
them.
The problem is that, under this analysis, C is credited with $500
of capital that he would not be entitled to upon the immediate liq124. The partnership would have no tax basis in this asset and, under general assignment of income principles, would recognize ordinary income.
125. The partnership recognized $500 of income that is offset by the $500 deduction.
The allocation of both the income and deduction should be made entirely to A and B as the
pre-grant partners. C's basis in the partnership interest is equal to the basis of the asset he
contributed-$ 500. See I.R.C. § 722 (2006).
126. The capital account maintenance rules under § 704(b) permit the revaluation of
capital accounts in certain circumstances. One such circumstance is the contribution of
money or property by an existing or new partner in exchange for an interest in the partnership. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(t)(5)(i) (2006). For grants of partnership interests on or
after May 6, 2004, revaluation is permissible even if the transaction is not characterized as
involving the contribution of property by the service partner to the partnership. See id. §
1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f(5)(iii) (2006). See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the capital account maintenance rules.
127. In substance, the existing partners have given away a portion of their capital. The
granting of a future profits interest is analogous to the carve-out of an income interest in an
income producing asset. Assume a bond has a value of $1,000. If the owner of the bond
grants the rights to a portion of the interest income generated by the bond to another party
the bond is still worth $1,000, but the value of the owner's interest has been reduced. However, due to the reliance of liquidation value in determining capital accounts, the value
attributable to the future profits interest cannot be recognized for purposes of maintaining
book capital accounts.
128. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b) (2006).
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uidation of the partnership. The capital accounts should reflect
the fact that C has zero capital in this case because he has no
claim to capital until profits are generated sometime in the future.
Under the current regulations, it is not clear how this result can
be achieved.
A similar problem arises in the event the partnership does not
recognize income as a result of the grant and the partner is not
deemed to contribute an asset to the partnership. In that case, C
will still recognize $500 of income, and the partnership is entitled
to the deduction of a similar amount. However, the partnership
will not recognize income from a deemed exchange of an asset.
The partnership's basis in its assets remains at $2,000, and the
partner's tax basis capital will be $750, $750, and $500 for A, B,
and C, respectively. 129 The book capital accounts of the partners
are revalued due to the grant of the interest to C.130 The fair market value of the partnership's property is $3,000. It is arguable
that crediting the capital accounts of A and B with $1,500 each is
permissible. 13 1 C has no claim to the assets that exist at the time
of the grant and, therefore, should have no book capital.
The tax accounting is further muddled by the issue of double
taxation of income to C. 1 32 Under the first scenario described
above, the partnership has a tax basis in an asset-future income-that has no corresponding value. 133 Disparities between
tax basis and book capital accounts must, under the safe harbor
capital account maintenance rules, be accounted for in a manner
that eliminates such disparities.134 Generally, this would require
129. The tax basis capital accounts of A and B are reduced by $250 each as a result of
the partnership's $500 deduction for the grant of the profits interest to C. C's tax basis
capital account will reflect the income recognized upon its receipt-$500.
130. Revaluation is permissible for grants of partnership interests on or after May 6,
2004, even if the transaction is not characterized as involving the contribution of property
by the service partner to the partnership. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(5)(iii) (2006).
131. Because C is not deemed to have contributed any assets to the partnership, it is
arguable that not crediting C with capital immediately after the receipt of the grant does
not run afoul of the capital account maintenance rules.
132. The use of the term "double taxation" refers to the possibility that the service partner recognizing the value of the future income immediately and subsequently, as the income is actually earned, recognizes it for a second time. However, the service partner will
not be subject to double taxation in the truest sense of the term because, even in cases
where the income is recognized twice, the service partner's basis in the partnership interest
is increased by the income. Such basis will be recouped, albeit belatedly, upon disposition
of the interest.
133. The value of the future profits interest is embedded in the value of the underlying
assets of the partnership.
134. In order to have economic effect, allocations must be reflected in the book capital
accounts of the partners. These allocations are determined in accordance with book values.

452

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 46

that C be allocated all the deductions generated by amortizing the
asset. This amortization would serve to reduce C's income in an
amount equal to the $500 of income he has previously recognized.
However, it is unclear how such an asset is amortized because
there appears to be no authority to amortize it and, if there were,
ascertaining an appropriate useful life over which to amortize it is
problematic. 135 Under the second scenario, C has $500 of tax basis
capital and zero book capital. This disparity needs to be eliminated, a result that can be accomplished by allocating income
away from C until the $500 disparity is eliminated. It is not clear
whether this is permissible and, if it is, how quickly it can be

done. 136
b.

Judicial and Administrative Guidance

Despite the analytical and practical issues, the Tax Court, in
Diamond v. Commissioner,13 7 held that the receipt by a taxpayer
of a sixty percent profit share in a real estate project was taxable.
The taxpayer received the profits interest in exchange for his services in negotiating financing for the venture. The taxpayer sold
the interest and reported the income as capital gain. The court, in
rejecting the applicability of Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1), stated
that "nothing in the foregoing regulations explicitly states that a
partner who has a received a partnership interest.., in exchange
for services already performed comes within the provisions of section 721.' 138 The court then proceeded to hold that the profits interest was taxable upon receipt based upon its fair market

value. 139

If such values differ from the tax basis allocations, then the tax basis allocation cannot
have economic effect. The regulations require that such tax allocations be made in accordance with I.R.C. § 704(c) principles. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b)(4)(i),
(b)(2)(iv)(f)(4) (2006). Section 704(c) will generally result in tax allocations that allocate
built-in appreciation or depreciation in assets to the partners that are economically entitled
to, or bear the economic burden of, such appreciation or depreciation. See generally I.R.C. §
704(c)(1)(A) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1,704-3 (2005). A detailed analysis of the mechanics of §
704(c) is beyond the scope of this work.
135. I.R.C. § 197 provides detailed rules for the recognition and amortization of certain
intangible assets including, goodwill and going concern value. A right to future profits may
be partially attributable to intangible assets but, in many partnerships, it will also derive
much of its value from deployment of tangible assets. Moreover, the technical language of §
197 appears to preclude recognition of such an asset. See generally I.R.C. § 197 (2006).
136. Arguably, the right to future profits has an indeterminate useful life.
137. 56 T.C. 530 (1971), affd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
138. Diamond, 56T.C. at 546.
139. Id. at 546-47.
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Diamond raised more questions than it answered. The facts in
Diamond were unusual in that the taxpayer sold his profits interest very quickly after its receipt, thereby allowing the court to
skirt difficult valuation issues. 140 Moreover, the fact that the interest was sold so quickly after receipt leads one to suspect that
the profits interest was merely a method to disguise compensation

income as capital gain. 141
The dispute in Diamond antedated the enactment of § 83.142
The broad language of § 83, which can comfortably extend to the
receipt of a profits interest, sits uncomfortably with the language
of Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1). The fact that § 83 was enacted over
a decade after the issuance of the regulation raised doubts about
43
the continuing vitality of the capital-profits interest dichotomy.1
The Internal Revenue Service was reluctant to wield Diamond in
the application of § 83 and instead skirted the issue by analogizing
a profits interest to an "unfunded, unsecured promise to pay deferred compensation."' 144 Several post-Diamond decisions held
that the receipt of a profits interest was governed by § 83, but
found that the value of the interests received, based on liquidation
values, was zero. 145 Other cases appeared to categorically hold
46
that the receipt of a profits interest was not a taxable event. 1
In Campbell v. Commissioner,147 the Eight Circuit, reversing
the Tax Court, agreed with the holding in Diamond that Treas.
Reg. 1.721-1(b)(1) was inapplicable to a transaction that resulted
in the receipt of a profits interest for services, but found that the
profits interest received by the taxpayer had only speculative, if
140. The court, in fact, held that the profits interest received was worth $40,000 which is
precisely what the taxpayer sold the interest for shortly after its receipt.
141. This point was noted in Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
142. Section 83 was enacted by § 321(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91171, 83 Stat. 486 (1969) and became effective for tax years ending after June 30, 1969.
143. The legislative history of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98
Stat. 1175 (1984), contains a statement, including a citation to Diamond, indicating that §
83 does govern the receipt of a partnership interest including the receipt of profits interest.
See STAFF OF THE S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 98th Cong., EXPLANATION OF THE DEFICIT

REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 11-226 n.1 (Comm. Print No. 169 1984). Section 73a of the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984, codified at I.R.C. § 707(a)(2), provides detailed rules to prevent
transactions that are, in reality, transactions between the partnership and a non-partner
from being treated as transactions between a partner and the partnership.
144. Cunningham, supra note 121, at 250 (quoting from I.R.S. Gen. Counsel Mem. 36346
(July 25, 1977)). See also Campbell, 943 F.2d at 818 (noting the I.R.S.'s concession that the
Tax Court erred in holding that the receipt of a profits interest was taxable).
145. See Cunningham, supra note 121, at 250-51.
146. See, e.g., Nat'l Oil Co. v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1986-596 (1986).
147. 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991), reuV'd, T.C.M. (CCH) 1990-236 (1990).

Duquesne Law Review

454

Vol. 46

8
any, value and, consequently, was not taxable upon its receipt. 14
However, the court did not squarely hold that the receipt of profits
interest created a taxable event in the absence of valuation issues.
Instead, the court viewed the holding in Diamond as a decision
predicated on the fact that the taxpayer in that case was compensated for services "other than in a partner capacity... and did not
149
intend to function or remain a partner."'
The Internal Revenue Service clarified the status of profits interests with the issuance of Rev. Proc. 93-27.150 This revenue procedure defined a profits interest in a partnership as a partnership
interest other than a capital interest.' 51 Echoing the liquidation
approach promulgated by Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1), Rev. Proc.
93-27 defined a capital interest as an interest in the partnership
that would yield proceeds to its holder if all the assets of the partnership were sold at their fair market value, and the proceeds of
such sales were distributed in complete liquidation of the partnership. 152 Rev. Proc. 93-27 provided that the receipt of a profits interest for services rendered for the benefit of a partnership in a
partner capacity or in anticipation of being a partner would not be
treated as a taxable event. 153
The Internal Revenue Service's position appears to be based
more on administrative convenience and valuation concerns than
doctrinal considerations because excepted from the scope of Rev.
Proc. 93-27 are profits interests in partnerships with substantially
certain and predictable income streams, profits interests disposed
of within two years of their receipt, and profits interests as a limited partner in publicly traded partnerships. 154 The Internal

148. Campbell, 943 F. 2d at 821, 823.
149. Id. at 822. I.R.C. § 707(a)(1) provides that a transaction between a partner and a
partnership will be characterized as a transaction between the partnership and a nonpartner if such partner is acting in a non-partner capacity. The scope of § 707(a) encompasses partnership profit allocations in exchange for services by a partner acting outside of
a partner capacity. I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006). If the service recipient is, in substance,
an employee, then the tax treatment should be governed by general tax principles and not
Subchapter K. See, e.g., Dorman v. United States, 296 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1961); Bagley v.
Comm'r, 105 T.C. 396 (1995); James v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 930 (1951). Regulations concerning
disguised payments for services have not been issued. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-2 (1992).
150. 1993-2 C.B. 343.
151.

Id.

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. A publicly traded partnership is a partnership whose interests are traded on an
established securities market or are readily tradable on a secondary market. I.R.C. §
7704(b) (2006). Most publicly traded partnerships are taxed as corporations. See id. §
7704(a). However, partnerships that have, and continue to, generate ninety percent or
more of their income from certain passive sources such as interest, dividends, real property
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Revenue Service subsequently clarified, in Rev. Proc. 2001-43, that
neither the grant of a substantially nonvested profits interest nor
the event that causes the interest to become vested are to be
treated as taxable events provided the transaction meets the requirements of Rev. Proc. 93-27.155 Prior to this clarification, it was
unclear whether the grant of a profits interest subject to substantial risk of forfeiture could trigger the application of § 83 upon the
vesting of the interest. If so, the profits interest may very well
have accreted some capital value at the time of vesting thereby,
absent a § 83(b) upon receipt of the interest, subjecting it to taxation. 156 The Internal Revenue Service made clear that no taxable
event occurs upon the vesting of the profits and that a § 83(b) election was unnecessary. 157 However, this treatment is conditioned
upon the treatment of the recipient of the nonvested interest as a
8
partner from the date of grant. 15
Despite the issuance of guidance by the Internal Revenue Service, many issues still surrounded the issuance of partnership
profits interests for services. If Rev. Proc. 93-27 is inapplicable,
159
taxpayers must contend with the issues previously discussed.
Moreover, the existing guidance does not entirely clarify how nonvested profits interests are to be treated. The treatment of the
recipient of a nonvested profits interest as a partner commencing
on the date of grant would result in taxable income allocations to
the service partner. 160 Arguably, such allocations cannot have
substantial economic effect under the § 704(b) regulations because
of the possibility that the interest may be forfeited.
Moreover, in the event the interest is forfeited, the tax consequences to the service partner and the partnership are not clear.
Because Rev. Proc. 2001-43 appears to make § 83 inapplicable, it
is arguable that the service partner could obtain a deduction or
rents, and securities gains, are not subject to corporate taxation. Id. § 7704(c)-(d). This
exception, in addition to the tax treatment of carried interests, has been the subject of
significant criticism and congressional attention. See infra note 240 and accompanying
text. The exceptions involve grants of interests that appear to be susceptible to straightforward valuation. The exception for interests disposed of within two years of its receipt
calls to mind Diamond. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
155. Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-34 I.R.B. 191.
156. See supranotes 115-16 for a discussion of the I.R.C. § 83(b) election.
157. Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-34 I.R.B. 191.
158. Id.
159. See supranotes 122-36 and accompanying text.
160. This result may force adjustments to the economics of the grant. Allocations of
income to a nonvested service partner may require some level of actual cash distributions
to the partner in order for that partner to fund the tax liability associated with the income
allocations.
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loss for income previously allocated and subsequently forfeited
and that the partnership has income resulting from the forfeiture
that should be allocated to the remaining partners. 161
C.

ProposedRegulations

On May 24, 2005, proposed regulations were issued that provide
comprehensive guidance on the tax treatment of transfers of compensatory partnership interests. 162 The proposed rules resolve
most, but not all, of the issues attendant to the grant of profits
interests. Under the proposed regulations, partnership interests,
both capital and profits interests, are explicitly made subject to §
83.163 Consequently, the categorical nonrecognition treatment
afforded compensatory profits interests pursuant to Rev. Proc. 9327 would, if and when the proposed rules are finalized, no longer

apply. 164
The proposed regulations do, however, provide for an election
that would allow the interest to be valued based on a hypothetical
liquidation value. 165 The liquidation value of a partnership interest is determined by the amount of cash the holder of the interest
would receive if the partnership, immediately after the interest is
transferred, sold all of its assets for cash equal to their fair market
value and liquidated. Consequently, a profits interest valued in
this fashion will obtain a zero value. Although the proposed regulations do not so state, this election is not available for partner-

161. Section 83 prohibits a deduction upon forfeiture to the recipient of property that
was taxed upon receipt of nonvested property pursuant to § 83(b) election. I.R.C. § 83(b)
(2006).
162. Partnership Equity for Services, 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675 (May 24, 2005).
163. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e), 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675, 29,680 (May 24, 2005). The proposed regulations state that "property includes a partnership interest" without making a
distinction between a capital and profits interest. Id. The preamble to the proposed regulations make clear that no distinction was intended. Partnership Equity for Services, 70 Fed.
Reg. 29,675 (May 24, 2005).
164. Rev. Proc. 93-27 and Rev. Proc. 2001-43 will become obsolete upon the finalization
of the regulations and the issuance of a new Rev. Proc. that will provide further guidance.
See I.R.S. Notice 2005-43, 2005-1 C.B. 1221.
165. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(1) (1), 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675, 29,680-81 (May 24, 2005). In
order to make the election, the partnership must prepare a document, executed by the
partner having responsibility for federal tax matters, stating that the elective procedure
will apply irrevocably to all transfers of interests for services while the election is in effect
and attach such document to the partnership's tax return for the year that includes the
effective date of the election. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3()(1)(i), 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675, 29,680
(May 24, 2005). In addition, the partnership agreement must contain certain provisions
and record retention policies must be in force. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.83-3(1)(1)(ii),(1)(2), 70
Fed. Reg. 29,675, 29,680-81 (May 24, 2005).
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ship interests that were exempted from the general rules of Rev.
Proc. 93-27.166
With respect to the transferor partnership, the proposed rules
clarify that no gain or loss is recognized by the partnership on the
transfer or substantial vesting of the interest. 167 The transfer of
the interest is treated as a guaranteed payment for services under
§ 707(c), and the timing of the income inclusion and deduction is
made subject to the general timing rules of § 83. Therefore, the
service partner will include the receipt of the interest in income in
the tax year in which the interest is received or vests and not un168
der the rules applicable to guaranteed payments in general.
The partnership's deduction will be allocable to the non-service

partners. 169
Provided the elective valuation method is used, the proposed
regulations leave the tax consequences of the receipt of a profits
166. I.R.S. Notice 2005-43, § 3.02, 2005-1 C.B. 1221. Therefore, partnership interests
related to a partnership whose assets have a substantially certain and predictable stream
of income, partnership interests transferred in anticipation of a subsequent disposition, and
partnership interests in publicly traded partnerships are not eligible for the elective valuation method. Id. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
167. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(b), 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675 (May 24, 2005). Whereas the
existing regulations provide that gain or loss is recognized by the transferor, except as
provided in § 1032, the proposed regulations provide that gain or loss is recognized by the
transferor, except as provided in § 721 and § 1032. Id. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(2)(i),
70 Fed. Reg. 29,675 (May 24, 2005), states that no gain or loss shall be recognized by the
partnership upon the transfer or substantial vesting of a compensatory partnership interest. Nonrecognition treatment also extends to the issuance of a partnership interest pursuant to the exercise of a compensatory partnership option. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b) (3),
70 Fed. Reg. 29,675 (May 24, 2005).
168. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(c), 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675 (May 24, 2005). See supra note
120 for a discussion of the rules applicable to guaranteed payments in general. It is not
clear whether nonrecognition treatment extends to partners in cases where the services are
rendered to a partner. In such cases, the proposed rules make clear that the partner,
rather than the partnership, is entitled to the deduction if otherwise allowable. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(4)(ii), 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675 (May 24, 2005). However, nonrecognition
treatment is applicable only to the partnership. The proposed regulations do not appear to
rule out the possibility that a transaction may be recharacterized as a transfer of the partnership interest by a partner and not the partnership or, for that matter, as a transfer by a
partner of a share of partnership assets to the recipient partner. Consequently, a partner
may recognize gain or loss on the transfer of an appreciated or depreciated partnership
interest. See generally McDougal v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 720 (1974).
169. The proposed regulations provide that such guaranteed payment is not subject to
allocation under I.R.C. § 706(d)(2)(B). Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.706-3(a), 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675
(May 24, 2005). Section 706(d) provides rules that govern the allocation of partnership
items during taxable years in which there is a change in any partner's interest in the partnership. Certain items are required to be apportioned over the period to which they are
attributable. The proposed regulations make clear that the guaranteed payment resulting
from the transfer of the partnership interest is not subject to such apportionment. For a
detailed discussion of I.R.C. § 706(d) see Matthew A. Melone, Distributive Shares and the
Varying Interest Rule: Planning Ideas and Open Issues, 14 J. PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 339
(1998).
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interest undisturbed. In the event the election is unavailable or
not made, inadvertently or purposely, the proposed regulations
clarify many of the tax accounting issues left unresolved by Rev.
Proc. 93-27. However, issues relating to valuation and the treatment of such interests in book capital accounts will remain for
those interests not valued at zero. 170
The proposed regulations do provide much needed clarity in the
tax accounting for non-vested partnership interests. As discussed
above, the proposed regulations subject the receipt of partnership
interests for services to § 83.171 Therefore, the recipient of a partnership interest that is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture
will be subject to tax in an amount equal to the fair market value
of the interest at the time the partner's interest substantially
vests and, concomitantly, the partnership may deduct a corre72
sponding amount as a guaranteed payment. 1
If the partnership has made the liquidation value election, the
fair market value of the partnership interest will be determined
assuming a hypothetical liquidation of the partnership at the time
the partner's interest substantially vests. The proposed regulations make clear that a person holding a partnership interest subject to substantial risk of forfeiture is not a partner for purposes of
Subchapter K solely by virtue of holding such interest. 173 Consequently, all income and loss will continue to be allocated to the
existing partners during the vesting period. The regulations are
not explicit as to the treatment of distributions during the period
that the interest is nonvested. Presumably, any distributions will
be treated as compensation to a person that is not a partner and
subject to all applicable payroll reporting and tax obligations.
Alternatively, the recipient partner may elect, pursuant to §
83(b), to include the value of the partnership interest upon receipt
despite the existence of a substantial risk of forfeiture. 174 In such
case, assuming the partnership has made the liquidation value
election, the value of a profits interest would be valued at zero.

170. See supra notes 122-36 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
172. The timing of the income inclusion and deduction for the guaranteed payment are,
under the proposed regulations, governed by the general timing rules of I.R.C. § 83 and not
I.R.C. § 707(c). See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
173. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(b), 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675 (May 24, 2005). The holder of
such an interest will, of course, be treated as partner if such person holds a partnership
interest, in addition to the nonvested interest, that is not subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture.
174. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
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Unlike Rev. Proc. 2001-43, the proposed regulations require that
the recipient partner make a § 83(b) election in order to assure
that the profits interest obtains a zero value at the point of tax
75
recognition. 1
Consequently, in contrast to existing rules, under which the receipt of qualified nonvested profits interest was categorically not
taxable, the proposed rules will require that two elections be in
effect at the time such interests are granted-the liquidation
value election and the § 83(b) election. The § 83(b) election will
also result in the service provider obtaining the status of a partner
at the time the interest is received. 176 Therefore, despite the general desirability of making the § 83(b) election, such election will
serve to accelerate the recognition of the recipient partner's allocable share of income during the vesting period.
The proposed rules also amend the capital account maintenance
rules to coordinate the application of those rules with the rules
governing the taxation of the receipt of nonvested partnership interests. In the event a § 83(b) election is made, the recipient of the
interest is treated as a partner upon receipt of the interest and,
accordingly, will be allocated a share of the partnership's income
or loss for a given taxable period. However, because the interest
may be forfeited, any allocations of income or loss cannot have
economic effect under the general safe harbor principles of §
704(b). 177 The proposed rules provide that such allocations will,
nonetheless, be respected if the partnership agreement requires
forfeiture allocations upon the forfeiture of the interest. 178

175. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
176. Prop. Tress. Reg. § 1.761-1(b), 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675 (May 24, 2005).
177. The safe harbor rules include the requirements that income and loss allocable to
partners be reflected in the partners' capital accounts and that the liquidation of the partnership be made in accordance with those capital accounts. See supra notes 94-96 and
accompanying text. See also Prop. Tress. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(xii)(a), Fed. Reg. 29,675 (May
24, 2005). Regardless of the amount of income or loss allocated, the holder of a partnership
interest subject to forfeiture will be entitled, with the exception of a return of capital contributions, to zero upon liquidation of the partnership prior to vesting.
178. Prop. Tress. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(xii)(b)(1), Fed. Reg. 29,675 (May 24, 2005). The
issuance of nonvested profits interests creates significantly more tax accounting complications than the issuance of compensatory options to acquire a partnership interest. The
grant of an option to acquire a partnership interest in exchange for services will, in general,
result in no tax consequences until exercise at which time the accounting for the issuance of
the interest would be relatively straight forward under the existing or proposed rules.
Generally, the use of options eliminates issues with respect to forfeiture because, until the
option is exercised, the option holder is not a partner. Moreover, any capital shift among
partners would be neatly accounted for because any such shift would be accounted for as a
guaranteed payment income to the option holder and as a deduction to the other partners.
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In general, forfeiture allocations are allocations of a pro rata
portion of the partnership's gross income, gain, gross deductions,
or loss to the forfeiting partner in the taxable year of forfeiture
that effectively reverse prior allocations of income, gain, deduction, or loss. In essence, prior allocations are reversed in the year
of forfeiture and allocated to the remaining partners. The forfeiture process is, however, not perfectly symmetrical. The proposed
rules require that the forfeiture allocations comprise a pro-rata
portion of all partnership items in the year of forfeiture. Therefore, the character of the forfeiture allocations may not be identical to the character of the allocations that such allocations seek to
reverse. Moreover, in the event that the partnership does not
have enough of the requisite items with which to make forfeiture
allocations, the reversal will not be complete-at least with re79
spect to reversal of prior income. 1
Under I.R.C. § 83(b), the service partner will be unable to recognize a loss upon forfeiture.' 8 0 The partnership recognizes gross
income in an amount equal to the deduction, if any, that was

Section 83 would apply to the grant of the option and rules analogous to the granting of
compensatory stock options should apply. See generally Melone, supra note 57, at 549-52.
Until further guidance is issued, the applicability of § 409A, dealing with nonqualified
deferred compensation plans, to compensatory options in a partnership context is uncertain. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Separate proposed regulations were issued
that contain detailed rules applicable to the grant and exercise of noncompensatory partnership options. The exercise of such options, however, usually entails a capital shift and
the proposed rules contain an elaborate mechanism to account for such capital shifts. See
generally Noncompensatory Partnership Options, 68 Fed. Reg. 2930 (Jan. 22, 2003) (as
corrected by 68 Fed. Reg. 15118 (March 28, 2003)).
179. The proposed regulations, in parenthetical language, state that forfeiture allocations are to be made "to the extent such items are available" and make no distinction between forfeiture allocations intended to reverse prior income or those that would reverse
prior losses. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(xii)(c), Fed. Reg. 29,675 (May 24, 2005).
However, pursuant to Notice 2005-43, 2005-1 C.B. 1221, § 4.04 (June 13, 2005), the I.R.S.
requires that the forfeiting partner recognize ordinary income in an amount equal to the
amount that forfeiture allocations fail to reverse. No such provision exists for shortfalls in
the reversal of prior income. Moreover, the loss disallowance rules of Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6
will preclude the forfeiting partner from recognizing a loss on the forfeiture.
180. This loss prohibition rule will apply regardless of whether the partnership had a
liquidation election in effect. Therefore, no loss may be recognized upon forfeiture whether
or not the service partner recognized taxable income upon the receipt of the interest. Treas.
Reg. § 1.83-2 provides that the forfeiture of property for which an I.R.C. § 83(b) election has
been made is recognizable to the extent the recipient of the property paid for the property.
Whether an increase in a partner's basis due to income allocations that are not fully reversed may be considered amounts "paid" for the property is doubtful. See Treas. Reg. §
1.83-3(g) (2005) (defining amounts paid with reference to the value of any money or property paid for the property). Moreover, the definition of amounts paid excludes any amount
paid for the right to receive income from property. Id. This provision could actually be read
to exclude loss recognition for amounts actually paid for a profits interest.
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taken as a result of the § 83(b) election.'18 The proposed regulations have clarified the tax accounting applicable to the issuance
of profits interest that is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.
Yet, at the same time, the proposed rules have also complicated
matters for the parties. Under the proposed rules, whether a §
83(b) election is made is critical to the tax implications for the recipient of the interest, the partnership, and the other partners.
Assume that a service provider is granted a ten percent capital
interest in a partnership in exchange for performing services in a
partner capacity. The capital interest will vest 100% in three
years provided that the service provider continues to provide the
required services up to that point. At the time the profits interest
is granted, the fair market value of partnership capital is
$1,000,000. During the three year vesting period, the partnership
generates $210,000 of taxable income. At the end of the vesting
period, the fair market value of partnership capital is $1,500,000.
If the service partner makes a § 83(b) election and the partnership elects to value the granted interest at its liquidation value,
the service provider will recognize $100,000 of income on the date
the capital interest is granted. The partnership is also entitled to
a compensation deduction of equal amount that is allocable to the
other partners. Moreover, because the § 83(b) election has been
made, the service provider is deemed a partner as of the date the
interest was granted. Consequently, partnership income will be
allocated to the service partner during the vesting period. If income is allocated in proportion to capital, the service provider will
recognize $21,000 of income over the three year vesting period. No
tax consequences will arise upon the vesting of the interest at the
end of year three.
Because of the possibility of forfeiture, the allocations of income
to the service partner do not have economic effect unless the partnership provides for forfeiture allocations. If the service partner
forfeits the interest in year three, the income allocable to the service partner in years one and two must be reversed through such
forfeiture allocations. 8 2 The service partner will be allocated
items of deductions in an amount equal to the income allocated to
such partner prior to forfeiture. If the partnership does not have
deductions in an amount equal to the prior income allocated, the
forfeiture allocations will not completely reverse the prior income.
181. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(c) (2004).
182. In year three, the year of forfeiture, no income would be allocable to the service
partner. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5), Example 29, 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675 (May 24, 2005).
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Upon forfeiture, the partnership must recognize income in the
amount of $100,000, the amount of its earlier compensation deduction. No loss is available to the service partner for her basis in
the partnership interest.
If, on the other hand, the service partner did not make a § 83(b)
election, no taxable event occurs until the interest vests at the end
of year three. At such time, the service provider will recognize
$150,000 of income, and the partnership will obtain a $150,000
deduction, assuming the partnership elected to value the interest
at liquidation value. During the vesting period, the service partner would receive no allocation of partnership income. Presumably, any distributions received by such partner during the vesting
period would be considered compensation.
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Critics of the tax treatment of carried interests believe that the
service partner is performing services, is being compensated for
such services, and therefore, should be taxed on such compensation in the manner compensation for services is normally taxedas ordinary income. The failure to tax the receipt of the profits
interest at the time of its receipt inappropriately defers income to
the service provider. Moreover, the recognition of income through
Subchapter K allows the service provider to convert what is, in
substance, compensation for services, to favorably taxed capital
gains.
Suggestions for reform have taken one of three basic forms.
First, the profits interest should be taxed, as compensation income, upon receipt at its fair market value. Second, analogizing a
profits interest to the purchase of a capital interest by means of an
interest-free nonrecourse loan, ordinary income should be imputed
to the service partner based on an appropriate interest rate.
Lastly, all income recognized by the service partner should be
taxed at ordinary income rates.
A.

Immediate Taxation of Profits Interests Upon Receipt

The proposed regulations, discussed above, explicitly provide
that a partnership interest, in whatever form, is property, the receipt of which is subject to § 83.183 However, because the proposed
183. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. In addition, a partnership interest is a
capital asset. I.R.C. § 741 (2006).
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rules allow liquidation value to be used to value the interest, the
receipt of the interest will, for all intents and purposes, not be subject to tax. 8 4 The treatment of a profits interest as property undermines a fundamental objection to taxing profits interests upon
receipt.
This objection is rooted in the notion that inchoate income or
earnings potential should not be subject to tax until a realization
event occurs. Human capital is not taxed until some transactional
85
basis exists that converts potential income to realized income.
Although economic justifications for taxing the "expectancy
value"' 8 6 of human capital do exist, these justifications are over87
whelmed by libertarian arguments against such taxation.
Moreover, the taxation of human capital under such a system
would call into question the propriety of distinguishing between
personal and for profit expenditures and the nondeductibility of
the former. If a system imposes a tax based on human capital's
potential, it is arguable that, heretofore, personal expenditures,
such as educational expenses, should be deductible if such expenditures result in increased earnings potential. 8 8 In addition, the
practical difficulties in administering such a scheme are probably
insurmountable.
The proposed regulations' treatment of a profits interest as
property provides a transactional underpinning to the tax man's
claim. 8 9 This characterization is consistent with the Uniform

184. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
185. With few exceptions, a realization event is required as an occasion to impose tax.
Income is generally not imputed. For example, home owners are not required to impute to
themselves rental income for the rental value of their home.
186. Rebecca C. Rudnick, Enforcing the FundamentalPremises of PartnershipTaxation,
22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 229, 232 (1993).
187. One justification for taxing the expectancy value of human capital is that such a
taxing scheme would tend to shift the supply of labor toward higher paying-and presumably more productive-endeavors. Such a system would tend to inject the heavy hand of
government into career and lifestyle decisions. Most, if not all, people would reject the loss
of autonomy such a system would entail. See generally Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Endowment, 55 DUKE L.J. 1145 (2006).
188. Educational expenses are deductible in certain circumstances. In general, educational expenses that maintain or improve skills required by an individual in his employment or trade or business or expenses that meet express employer, legal, or regulatory
requirements that are required to maintain employment, status, or compensation levels are
deductible. However, expenses for education that is required to meet minimum educational
requirements for a trade or business or employment are not deductible. See generally
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)-(b) (1967).
189. An alternative transactional approach to the taxation of a profits interest is to
characterize the transaction as a compensatory payment to the service providing partner
from the other partners followed by a contribution of such payment to the partnership by
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Partnership Act's characterization of a partnership interest as
personal property and the tax code's treatment of partnership interests as distinct capital assets. 190 However, the categorization of
a profits interest as property, while necessary, may not be sufficient. For example, contractual claims to compensation are not
taxed at the time the contract is executed. Alex Rodriguez was not
taxable on the present value of his ten year, $ 250 million contract
to play baseball upon its execution despite the fact that, like typical baseball contracts, it was guaranteed.
Is a profits interest sufficiently distinguishable from an unfunded unsecured contractual promise? To be sure, a profits interest bears a resemblance to such promises but, unlike the typical
contractual commitment, it carries with it certain legal entitlements such that it may be more akin to a share of stock than an
unsecured contractual right. All state law property rights associated with a capital interest attach to profits interests, including
the managerial rights that attach to a general partnership inter19 1
est.
Assuming a profits interest is distinguishable from a mere contractual promise to support the taxation of such interest upon receipt, two additional issues present themselves. The first, valuation, is of practical, not doctrinal, concern and should not prove
fatal. The second issue raises a more fundamental concern. Under
the current taxing scheme, the imposition of tax upon receipt of a
profits interest will lead to double taxation. Such a result is fundamentally at odds with the purpose and spirit of Subchapter K.
Determining the value of a profits interest based on immediate
liquidation value has the advantage of simplicity and reinforces
the centrality of the capital account maintenance rules in allocating income among partners. Partnerships, however, are not
formed with a view toward immediate liquidation. As Professor
Cunningham has pointed out, a partnership interest consists of
two distinct interests: the right to a return of contributed capital
and the right to share in profits. 192 These rights may be, and often
are, disaggregated as evidenced by income allocation percentages
to partners that are disproportionate to such partners' percentage
the service providing partner in exchange for the profits interest. This approach does not,
however, reflect the realities of the transaction.
190. See Cunningham, supra note 121, at 268; I.R.C. § 741 (2006).
191. See Cunningham, supra note 121, at 268 (citing Campbell, 59 T.C.M. (CCH), at 250
(1990)).
192. Id. at 252.
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of capital contributions. Economically, the value of a partnership
interest is dependent on both the value of the capital and the profits interest in the same way that the value of a bond is dependent
on the present value of both its income stream and right to princi93
pal repayment. 1
Admittedly, it is more difficult to value a profits interest in a
partnership with uncertain cash flows, hurdle rates, and clawback
provisions, than it is to value an instrument with predictable cash
flows. Many transactions, however, have difficult to value elements and a profits interest should prove no more difficult to
value than many other equity flavored instruments. Arguments in
favor of the status quo that posit valuation difficulty as a rationale
are strikingly similar to the arguments made in opposition to expensing stock options-an argument that raged for over a decade
and was finally resolved in favor of expensing. 194 The fact that the
tax law does not place a value on compensatory stock options is
more an indictment of the tax treatment of such options than it is
support for the position that profits interests have no ascertainable value. 195 Such interests are probably more susceptible to reasonable valuation than many esoteric financial positions such as
shares in mortgage pools or complex derivatives.196 It is also
unlikely that the extent of valuation disputes that present themselves in other settings, such as estate planning and charitable
193. Id. at 252-53.
194. In 1993, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued an exposure draft that
would have required that the issuance of compensatory stock options be accounted for as an
expense in an amount determined under fair market value models. The business community in general and the technology industry in particular fought the proposal vehemently.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board, under pressure from Congress, relented. See
generally Matthew A. Melone, Are Compensatory Stock Options Worth Reforming, 38
GONZAGA L. REV. 535, 554-558 (2003). In the aftermath of the corporate scandals that came
to light earlier this decade, public sentiment turned markedly negative about the levels of
executive compensation, and efforts to require expensing such options gained traction. The
Financial Accounting Standards Board issued a new standard that requires expensing of
options effective, for most public companies, for interim and annual reporting periods beginning after June 15, 2005. See SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, STATEMENT OF FIN. ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS. No. 123 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2004).
195. See infra notes 249-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the tax treatment
of compensatory stock options. Critics of the current tax rules applicable to profits interests
issued for services often analogize to the tax treatment of compensatory stock options to
support the claim that recipients of profits interest are unfairly advantaged in comparison
to recipients of compensatory stock options. See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Susan Pulliam, U.S. Investors Face an Age of Murky Pricing,WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 12, 2007, at Al; David Reilly, In Current Crunch,Auditors Stand Firm on Accounting
Practices,WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2006, at C1. See also David Reilly & Gregory Zuckerman,
Pricing Tactics of Hedge Funds Under Spotlight, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2007, at C1 (reporting
on academic research that suggests some hedge fund managers price illiquid securities at
favorable levels to boost performance).
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giving, would be duplicated in profits interests transactions simply because the universe of persons receiving profits interests is
miniscule compared to persons that transfer wealth, either to fam197
ily members or to charitable organizations.
Various proposals for valuing profits interest have been put
forth. A profits interest, in many respects, resembles a call option
on the capital of the partnership.1 98 For example, the grant of a
twenty percent profits interest is economically equivalent to the
grant of an option to purchase twenty percent of the capital of the
partnership at a future date with a strike price set at twenty percent of the present capital of the partnership. In effect, the option
holder would capture twenty percent of the increase in the capital
value of the partnership. Option valuation models, such as the
Black-Scholes method, could be used to value such options. 199 Mi197. Ironically, partnerships play a significant role in estate planning. Family limited
partnerships are a common vehicle for retention of control and minimizing the value of a
family business passed on to younger generations. See generally David M. Guess, Disregarding the Mona Lisa's DisappearingMustache: An Analysis into the Increased Judicial
Scrutiny of the Tax Treatment of Family Limited PartnershipInterests, 32 W. ST. U. L. REV.
177 (2005).
198. See The Taxation of CarriedInterests, supra note 30, at 6.
199. The Black-Scholes model was developed by Fischer Black and Myron Scholes, who
published a paper in 1973 that presented the model. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes,
The Pricingof Options and CorporateLiabilities, 81 J. POLITICAL ECON. 637 (1973). In its
original form, the model was formulated to obtain values for European options on nondividend paying stock. It has been refined so that it may be used to value U.S. options and
options on dividend paying stock. Five principal variables influence the price of an option:
(1) the current stock price; (2) the exercise price of the option; (3) the volatility of the stock
price; (4) the option's time to maturity; and (5) the risk-free interest rate.
A binomial option pricing model establishes a portfolio of stock and options so that there is
no uncertainty about the value of the portfolio at the end of the option period. The model,
described as a series of decision trees based upon stock price movements during particular
segments of an option's life, assumes a riskless portfolio and results in the portfolio earning
a risk-free rate of return. The model also factors in the option's delta, the ratio of the
change in the price of the option to the change in the price of the underlying stock, by periodically rebalancing the stock holdings. See generally JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES,
AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 194-207 (4th ed. 2000). These models are used to value publicly
traded options, and it has been argued that neither model is appropriate for valuing compensatory stock options which are usually subject to vesting schedules and other liquidity
restrictions. Similar objections would likely be made to the use of these models in valuing
profits interests.
There are other methods for valuing options. The intrinsic value method values the option
by comparing the stock price with the exercise price at a specific point in time. It is also
possible to value options by simply assuming a certain level of stock appreciation and discounting the value to the present. Each of these alternative methods is considered inferior
to the Black-Scholes and binomial methods because their underlying assumptions are unsound. Another approach is to create a market for such options. Coca-Cola, for example,
entered into an arrangement whereby its options are valued through a market mechanism.
See Floyd Norris & Sherri Day, Coke to Report Stock Options as an Expense, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 2002, at Al. The Securities and Exchange Commission has recently approved the
use of an auction process by Zions Bancorp to establish option values for purposes of finan-
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chael Knoll, applying the Black-Scholes method, has estimated
that the value of a profits interest is between 5.91% and 8.6% of
invested capital for investments with terms between four and
00
seven years. 2
Other valuation proposals have likened the grant of a profits interest to the purchase of a capital interest through the use of nonrecourse debt. 20 1 The grant of a twenty percent profits interest is
analogous to a nonrecourse loan made by the limited partners to
the service provider. The service provider, in turn, uses the borrowed funds to purchase a twenty percent capital interest in the
fund. In the absence of a hurdle rate, this is tantamount to a compensatory interest-free loan. 20 2 This analysis would yield a value
equal to the difference between the present value of the loan and
its face amount. Such value would depend on the interest rate
used to discount the loan and the term of the loan. 203
The existence of various valuation methodologies makes clear
that profits interests are susceptible to valuation. These proposals
also evidence the danger of taxation by analogy. The two proposals discussed above, the call option and the below-market rate
loan, would yield disparate values. Option valuation is dependent
on several variables, including the length of time the option is exercisable and the underlying volatility of the assets subject to the
option. An option to acquire interests in assets whose values fluctuate greatly would be of higher value than an option on a stable
portfolio of assets. The value of a below-market loan is a function
of time and interest rates.
Presumably, the volatility of the underlying assets would influence the determination of a market interest rate. The greater the
volatility of the underlying assets, the more risk is placed on the
cial statement reporting. See David Reilly, Zions Cleared for Auction on Options, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 22, 2007, at C2. The Financial Accounting Standards Board, in its recently promulgated standard requiring the expensing of compensatory options, specifically mentions the
use of option pricing models, but does not mandate a specific method of valuation. See
SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, supra note 194, App. A at
A13-A18.
200. Michael S. Knoll, The Taxation of Private Equity CarriedInterests: Estimating the
Revenue Effects of Taxing Profit Interests as OrdinaryIncome, 10 (Institute for Law & Economics U. of Pa. Law School Research Paper No.
07-20, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.comabstract=lO07774.
201. Id. at 7.
202. A hurdle rate below a market rate of interest would still contain compensatory
features whose value is obviously less than an interest-free loan.
203. The tax treatment of below-market interest rate loans depends on whether the loan
is a demand or term loan. See infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text. The belowmarket loan analogy is used to support a carve out of a portion of the carried interest as
compensation on an annual basis. See infra notes 214-21 and accompanying text.
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lender. Hence, a higher market rate of interest should attach to
the loan. It is unlikely, however, that the interest rate determined
would yield a discount equal to the value of an option determined
under an option valuation model. This is because a loan is not
identical to an option. 20 4 An option gives the holder the right to
exercise the option without interference from the option grantor.
A lender has greater rights than an option grantor and, consequently, bears less risk. Moreover, in the event the property declines in value, an option holder will let the option expire and realize a loss in the amount of any premium paid for the option. A
nonrecourse borrower who relinquishes the property in satisfaction of the debt may realize gain or loss on the transaction. 20 5 The
fact that analogies may be drawn to two disparate types of transactions highlights the difficulty of attempting to classify a profits
interest as something it is not.
The current taxation of a profits interest at whatever value may
be assigned to it presents a dilemma. Under present law, the income represented by the profits interest would be taxed twice,
once upon receipt of the interest and again when such income is
actually realized by the partnership. This double tax runs counter
to the spirit and purpose of Subchapter K. Alternatively, a mechanism to prevent the double taxation of such income may be established. This device may be designed to prevent the putative conversion of ordinary income to capital gain.
Assume that a limited partnership is formed and that ten limited partners each contribute $10,000,000 in cash. Collectively,
the limited partners own 100% of the capital interests in the partnership. The general partner will manage the fund and receives a
twenty percent profits interest in the partnership. At formation,
but prior to the recognition of any income from the receipt of the
profits interest, the partnership's tax basis balance sheet and §
704(b) book basis balance sheet would be as follows:
204. The loan analogy may be, but is not, applied to compensatory stock options. In
essence, the employer has made a nonrecourse, interest free loan to the employee in an
amount equal to the fair market value of the stock underlying the option on the date of
grant. This categorization of an option transaction would dramatically change its tax consequences. Note that most loans by publicly traded corporations to directors or executive
officers are now prohibited. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 402(a), 116
Stat. 745, 787 (2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k)(1)).
205. The debtor will be deemed to have sold the property to the lender in an amount
equal to the debt owed. If the debtor's basis in the property differs from the amount of the
debt balance gain or loss will be realized. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(b)(1980). See also
Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983). This issue may not present itself in an investment
partnership that holds little or no depreciable or amortizable assets.
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Tax Basis

Tax Basis

Cash
$100,000,000206

Capital
LPs
$100,000,000

Book Basis

Cash

$100,000,000

GP
0

469
Book Basis

Capital
LPs
$100,000,000
GP
0

Assume that the profits interest is valued, based on a reasonable valuation model, at $5,000,000. The partnership's tax basis
and § 704(b) balance sheet would be as follows:
Tax Basis

Cash
$100,000,000207

Tax Basis

Book Basis

Capital
LPs
$95,000,000

Cash
$100,000,000

GP
$5,000,000

Book Basis

Capital
LPs
$95,000,000
GP
$5,000,000

The general partner's tax basis in the partnership equals the
amount of income recognized on the transfer and the limited partners' capital accounts, as a result of the compensation deduction,
are correspondingly reduced by a like amount. The § 704(b) book
capital accounts would mirror the tax basis accounts. 20 8 The fact
that the general partner has agreed to manage the assets should
not affect the value of the assets. In this case, the amount of cash
held by the partnership has not changed. 20 9 Economically, the
206. This example ignores organizational costs and start-up expenses and assumes that
the entire capital infusion is available for investment.
207. This example ignores organizational costs and start-up expenses and assumes that
the entire capital infusion is available for investment.
208. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
209. One commentator has suggested that the value of partnership assets have increased, otherwise the limited partners would not agree to compensate the general partner.
See Henry Ordower, Taxing Service Partnersto Achieve HorizontalEquity, 46 TAX LAW. 19,
21-23 (1992). As the example illustrates, the value of the assets has not changed-only the
sharing of the income stream has changed. It is obvious that the limited partners expect a
return on their investment that compensates them for the transfer of a portion of the in-
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limited partners have transferred a portion of the potential earnings stream of the partnership's assets to the general partner.
The problem with the above accounting is that, under current
rules, the § 704(b) capital accounts are to reflect liquidation values
based on the value of the assets reflected on the partnership's balance sheet for such purposes. The general partner is not entitled
to $5,000,000 upon immediate liquidation. She is entitled to nothing at this point. 210 Moreover, as the partnership earns income,
the general partner will be taxed on her distributive share in full,
despite the fact that she was already taxed on receipt of the profits
interest-whose value was based on these very earnings. The
capital accounts, both tax basis and book, will reflect the allocation of such income thereby maintaining the $5,000,000 distortion
211
in the book capital accounts.
One possible solution is to amend the § 704(b) capital account
maintenance rules to make it clear that the receipt of the profits
interest is not reflected in the capital accounts. It is arguable that
the value of the profits interest should not be reflected in the book
capital accounts. Such accounts are adjusted to reflect the fair
market value of property contributed to the partnership. The service partner does not contribute any property to the partnership
with respect to the compensatory element of the profits interest
received.212 Accordingly, the service partner's book capital account would not be increased. Failure to reflect the value of the
profits interest in the capital account of the service partner would
create a disparity between the tax basis and book basis capital
accounts.
In the above example, the general partner would have a tax basis capital account of $5,000,000 and a § 704(b) book basis of zero.
This disparity could be eliminated using § 704(c) principles by allowing the general partner to offset the first $5,000,000 of income

come stream. This return is prospective. It has not been earned and, if and when it is, it
will be reflected in the asset values.
210. The proposed regulations under I.R.C. § 83 take account of this fact and permit
profits interests to be valued at liquidation value. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
211. In the event that the income allocated to the general partner is subject to tax in full
then the general partner will be entitled to recover the additional tax basis in her capital
account resulting from the taxation of the receipt of the profits interest upon termination of
the partnership. However, the recovery of this basis would be at capital gain rates. See
I.R.C. § 741 (2006).
212. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b) (2006).
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earned by the partnership and allocated to the general partner. 213
This approach would prevent the general partner from incurring
tax twice on the income. Assuming the partnership generates
capital gain, the offset of such capital gain would also serve to
prevent the general partner from converting ordinary income into
capital gain income.
Taxing the profits interest upon receipt is preferable to the two
alternatives discussed below if the service partner is shielded from
the potential to be taxed twice on the same income. However, neither the current tax rules nor the proposed regulations appear to
allow the offset of income allocated to the service partner and previously recognized in the value of the carried interest.
In addition, despite its advantages over alternative reform proposals, immediate taxation of the carried interest fails to acknowledge that these arrangements are the prototypical poolings of labor and capital for which the flexibility offered by Subchapter K
was intended. As discussed subsequently, not all the fruits of
one's labor are taxed as ordinary income--certain returns from
labor are taxed as returns from capital. The nature of the service
partner's relationship with the capital providers warrants that the
income allocable to the carried interest be classified through the
partnership.
B.

Below-Market Loan

As discussed above with respect to valuation, a profits interest
in a partnership can be likened to an interest-free or belowmarket interest nonrecourse loan to the service providing partner
by the capital providing partners.214 For example, assume a general partner obtains a twenty percent profits interest in a partnership that has $1,000,000,000 in capital at the time the profits interest is granted. Economically, the grant of the profits interest
can be viewed as a $200,000,000 nonrecourse loan from the capital
providing partners to the service partner. Assuming no hurdle
rate, the loan is interest free. 215 The loan proceeds are used by the
213. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. A position can be asserted that § 704(b)
capital accounts would not reflect the value of the profits interest received. See supra note

131. However, under present rules no mechanism exists for eliminating the disparity between tax basis and § 704(b) capital accounts. One possible mechanism that would achieve
this result is for the partnership to record, for the benefit of the service providing partner,
an asset that could be amortized against income allocable to the service partner.
214. See supranotes 201-03 and accompanying text.
215. The existence of a hurdle rate would reduce the compensatory element of the loan.
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service partner to acquire a $200,000,000 capital interest in the
partnership. Thus, the service partner would be entitled to twenty
percent of the fund's appreciation in value as a capital contributing partner.
The most prominent proponent of this reformulation of the
transaction is Professor Victor Fleischer. 216 Professor Fleischer
has argued that this approach avoids many of the problems associated with taxing all the income generated from the carried interest as ordinary income, including the inevitable gamesmanship
that would occur if such an approach were adopted. 217 Under this
taxing scheme, the service partner would report ordinary income
based on the free or below-market use of the limited partners'
capital. The interest rate on the loan should, as Professor
Fleischer notes, be quite high due to the risky nature of such a
loan. 218 However, Professor Fleischer proposes use of the applicable federal rate for practical purposes.219
Adoption of this taxation model would result in the service
partner reporting ordinary income in an amount equal to the
deemed loan times the cost of capital rate. Assuming an eight percent cost of capital rate in the above example, the service partner
would report compensation income in the amount of
$16,000,000.220 The limited partners would be entitled to a com22 1
pensation deduction of a like amount.
There are several problems with the cost of capital approach.
First, under present tax law, this approach would yield little, if
any, change to the results obtained under the present taxing
216. Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing PartnershipProfits in Private Equity
Funds (Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-27, 2006, revised Aug.
at
2008),
available
N.Y.U.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2,
2007)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.ctm?abstractid=892440. This approach has been advocated by others. See Leo Schmolka, Taxing PartnershipInterests Exchanged for Services:
Let Diamond/Campbell Quietly Die, 47 TAX L. REV. 287 (1991).
217. Fleischer, supra note 216, at 44.
218. Id. at 45.
219. Id. The applicable federal rate is a rate determined periodically by the Internal
Revenue Service based on the average market yields of marketable obligations of the
United States. Separate rates are determined for short-term, mid-term, and long-term
obligations. See I.R.C. § 1274(d) (2006).
220. This figure assumes, for simplicity, annual compounding.
221. Professor Fleischer indicates that the service partner would increase her basis in
the partnership for the amount of the tax due on such income and that the limited partners
would obtain a deduction for such amount. However, the deduction to the limited partners
should equal the income to the service partner and not the tax paid by such partner. Otherwise the income and deductions are not equivalent. See Fleischer, supra note at 216, at
45 n.144. It is not clear whether the partnership is the deemed lender or whether the limited partners are deemed to have made the loan directly to the service partner.
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scheme. Second, it is unlikely that an actual loan on such terms
would be respected as such under present law. Finally, the transaction is not a loan and should not be treated as such. In fact, the
loan analogy helps bring into focus that the transaction is the sort
of pooling of labor and capital to which Subchapter K was designed to apply.
The tax consequences of below-market loans are detailed in
I.R.C. § 7872. This section applies to gift loans, compensation related loans, corporation-shareholder loans, tax avoidance loans,
loans to continuing care facilities, and other loans if the interest
arrangement would have a significant affect on the tax liability of
the borrower or lender. 222 Whether a loan is below-market is determined by reference to the applicable federal rate. 22 3 Section
7872 creates a fictional two-step transaction. In a compensation
related loan, the below-market interest element, termed forgone
interest, is deemed transferred to the borrower as compensation. 224 If the loan is a demand loan, the forgone interest is
deemed transferred annually. The borrower, in turn, is deemed to
have retransferred such amount to the lender as interest. 225
In the case of a term loan, the entire amount of interest forgone
is deemed transferred at the time the loan is made. 226 The interest forgone is defined as the excess of the amount loaned over the
present value of all loan payments determined by discounting
such payments at the applicable federal rate. 22 7 The forgone interest is treated as original issue discount on the loan and amortized over the life of the loan under an effective yield method. 228
Consequently, a below-market demand loan will yield equal
amounts of compensation and interest to both borrower and
lender. A term loan will result in acceleration of compensation
income and deductions to the borrower and lender, respectively.
These items will be completely offset over the life of the loan by
interest deductions and interest income to the borrower and
lender, respectively.
222. See I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1) (2006). Certain de minimis rules apply that exempt relatively modest loans between individuals, compensatory loans, and corporation-shareholder
loans. Id. § 7872(c)(2). Presumably, a below-market loan to a service partner would be
considered a compensation related loan to an independent contractor.
See id. §
7872(c)(1)(B)(ii).
223. Id. § 7872(e).
224. Id. § 7872(a)(1)(A).
225. Id. § 7872(a)(1)(B).
226. Id. § 7872(b)(1).
227. I.R.C. §§ 7872(b)(1), (0(1) (2006).
228. Id. § 7872(b)(2).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 46

For example, assume that A receives a $1,000,000 compensation
related interest-free demand loan from B and that the applicable
federal rate is five percent. A is deemed to have received $50,000
in compensation from B, which she promptly remits back to B as
interest. Therefore, A would report $50,000 of compensation income and $50,000 of interest expense. B would report $50,000 of
interest income and $50,000 in compensation expenses. Whether
A could partially or fully deduct the interest would depend upon
the use to which she put the funds. 229 If the interest-free loan had
a five year term, A would report compensation income of $216,474,
the difference between the amount of the loan, $1,000,000, and its
present value, $783,526.230 B would have a corresponding compensation deduction. In years one through five, A incurs interest
expense and B recognizes interest income in the amount of
$216,474.231
A below-market demand loan would have no effect on the tax liability of the service partner because the compensatory element is
offset exactly by interest expense. 232 A term loan would result in
acceleration of income that is offset by interest expense over the
term of the loan. The service partner would, cumulatively, recognize zero ordinary income over the term of the loan. In effect, this
approach approximates results obtained by the immediate recognition of income upon receipt of the profits interest and the pres-

229. Various limitations apply to the deductibility of interest expenses. Interest deductions generated by mortgage debt incurred on primary and secondary residences are limited in amount. Interest deductions generated by debt incurred to fund investments are
limited to the income generated by such investments. A taxpayer may elect to treat capital
gains as investment income for this purpose. Such election, however, denies favorable tax
rates to such capital gains. I.R.C. §§ 1(h)(2), 163(d)(4) (2006). Interest deductions generated by debt incurred to fund a passive activity are limited by the passive activity loss
rules. Interest deductions on debt used to fund personal expenditures, other than mortgage
debt, with minor exceptions, are disallowed. Moreover, in certain circumstances, interest
expenses must be capitalized. See I.R.C. §§ 163(d), (h), 263A, 469 (2006). Interest expenses
are allocated among expenditures by tracing disbursements of debt proceeds to specific
expenditures. The nature of the expenditures to which the debt was traced determines the
tax treatment of the interest expense. See generally Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T (1987);
Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-8 (1994).
230. This example assumes that the applicable federal rate is five percent, the same rate
that applied to the demand loan, and ignores compounding.
231. The interest expense and income figures for years one through five are $39,176,
$41,135, $43,192, $45,352, and $47,619, respectively. The original issue discount, which is
equivalent to the compensation amount, is amortized using the effective yield method-in
this example, five percent. Each year's interest is added to the loan balance thereby increasing the interest income figure in subsequent years.
232. It is assumed that the service partner would face no restrictions in deducting such
interest expense.
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ence of a mechanism for recouping such income to avoid double
233
taxation.
Professor Fleischer proposes that, instead of the interest deductions described above, the service partner increase her basis in the
partnership as a result of the income recognized. 234 It is difficult
to find statutory or economic support for this result. If the loan is
from the capital providing partner to the service partner, its tax
consequences are accounted for outside Subchapter K. This is a
transaction among partners, not one among a partner and the
partnership. The partners' basis in the partnership should be unaffected by such a transaction. If the loan is deemed to have come
from the partnership, the compensatory element arises from a
transaction between the partner and the partnership in a nonpartner capacity. The income imputed to the partner is not an
allocation of partnership income-it is compensation. Accordingly,
such income should not affect the partner's tax basis in her partnership interest. Assuming, for sake of argument, that the partner's tax basis in the partnership should be increased, a corresponding increase should be made to the partner's § 704(b) capital
account. Such a result would not comport with the economics of
the transaction. The service partner would have no greater claim
to the assets of the partnership upon liquidation.
The below-market interest rate rules do not create income. Over
the life of the loan, no income is created because, other than the
loan proceeds, no cash or other assets are transferred between the
parties. These rules are intended to prevent taxpayers from avoiding the limitations on the deductibility of interest expenses. The
tax code recasts the transaction as a market rate loan that is
funded by additional compensation.
What § 7872 does not do is recharacterize the income that the
borrower generates from the borrowed funds. Assuming no restrictions on the deductibility of interest expenses, the taxable
income generated from a below-market rate loan is derived from
the use of the proceeds. The loan proceeds enable the borrower to
invest, payoff debt, or make consumption expenditures without
liquidating other investments or borrowing from a third party
lender. The investment income generated, or the interest expense
avoided, generate the tax consequences of the below-market loan.
If Corporation X loans $20,000,000 to employee Y interest free, §
233. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text. The loan scenario, however, would
not result in a reduction of capital gain income.
234. See supra note 216. See also supra note 221.
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7872 has no application to Y's use of the money. If Y invested the
funds in a risky stock and turned the $20,000,000 into $20 billion,
so be it. Y's gain is capital gain. Section 7872 merely requires that
Y report compensation income for the value of the interest-free
loan and take a corresponding interest deduction as if the corporation charged a market rate of interest on the loan and paid Y additional salary to cover the interest expense.
Attempts to recast the issuance of a profits interest as a loan
highlight the difficulty of taxation by analogy. The loan analogy
can be extended to many transactions, including compensatory
stock options. 235 Could it be just as plausible that the limited
partners loaned 100% of the capital to the service partner, who
then pays a participating interest rate to the putative lenders?
This would allow the service partner to capture all the capital
gains. This analogy strains credulity and would not be respected
by the tax authorities. Likewise, a profits interest is not a loan,
and, it is likely that an actual loan on such terms would not be
considered a loan. It would more likely be considered some form of
an option. 236
The loan scenario brings into sharp focus the pooling of labor
and capital that captures the essence of Subchapter K. A thirdparty lender would not loan the service partner the funds necessary to acquire the requisite capital interest on a nonrecourse basis with terms that would allow the service partner to capture the
income generated by a carried interest. Professor Knoll suggests
that the limited partners' cost of capital is the return that they
would earn on their capital contributions. Therefore, a loan at
such rates would require a service partner to pay any and all prof237
its she earns to the limited partners as interest.
However, Professor Knoll does not take into account that the
cost of capital to the limited partners-what they could earn on
their capital contributions-is dependent on the efforts of the service partner. A more pertinent question is what could the capital
providing partners earn on investments outside the fund? If the
limited partners believe that the returns on their capital, after
factoring in the cost of the carried interest, exceed alternative re235. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
236. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(a)(2) provides that "if the amount paid for the transfer of property is an indebtedness secured by the transferred property, on which there is no personal
liability to pay all or a substantial part of such indebtedness, such transaction may be in
substance the same as the grant of an option."
237. See Knoll, supranote 200, at 15.
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turns, the transaction makes economic sense. The hypothetical
loan would be made only on the condition that the service partner
agrees to share returns on the loaned capital.
In the case of a twenty percent carried interest, the service
partner would, in exchange for the loan, agree to generate returns
for capital that is 400% greater than the amount loaned. The loan
analogy is strained because a third-party lender would not enter
into such a transaction, and the limited partners would do so only
because the service partner is adding value to their capital contributions. A true debtor-creditor relationship would not arise. This
transaction takes place because it allows the pooling of the service
partner's talents and the limited partners' capital to achieve returns that the parties could not achieve individually.
C.

Income Allocable to Carry as OrdinaryIncome

Another reform proposal would tax all the income allocable to
the carried interest as ordinary income. This is the alternative
approach favored by Professor Mark Gergen and has found a receptive audience in the House of Representatives. 238 Proponents
of taxing all income allocable to the carried interest assert that
horizontal equity considerations demand such treatment. This
treatment places income derived by the service partner's labor on
similar footing with the income derived by other service providers.
The ability to convert income from labor into tax-favored capital
gains distorts incentives and leads to a disproportionate allocation
of labor to tax-favored activities. 239 Moreover, the tax benefits of
compensation derived in the form of a carried interest may serve
as a disincentive for the funds to go public, thereby preventing the
democratization of the fund industry. 240 Finally, a principal rea238. See generally How to Tax Carried Interests: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Mark P. Gergen, Fondren Chair for Faculty Excellence, U. Of Texas School of Law) [hereinafter How to Tax Carried Interests], available at
www.senate.gov/-finance/hearings/testimony/2007testO7llO7testmg.pdf; Mark P. Gergen,
Reforming Subchapter K Compensating Service Partners,48 TAX L. REV. 69 (1992); H.R.
2834, 110th Cong. (2007).
239. See Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone 31 (Illinois Law & Economics Research
2007),
available
at
Paper
No.
LE07-036,
Paper
Series,
Research
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1012472.
240. Senators Baucus and Grassley have introduced a bill, referred to as the "Blackstone
Bill," that would tax publicly traded private equity firms as corporations. See S. 1624,
110th Cong. (2007). Under present law, publicly traded partnerships are taxed as corporations but an exception exists for partnerships that derive at least ninety percent of their
income from certain passive sources, such as interest, dividends, capital gains, rents, royalties, and certain natural resource activities. See generally I.R.C. § 7704 (2006). Several
fund managers have gone public with the most noteworthy being Blackstone. The Black-
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son for the existence of a capital gain tax preference is to provide
incentives for investors to undertake risks with their capital-a
241
rationale that is inapplicable to a service provider.
A bill, H.R. 2834, has been introduced in the House of Representatives that would tax income attributable to the carried interest
as ordinary income. The bill would tax any net income with respect to an investment services partnership interest as ordinary
income earned from the performance of services. 242 Moreover, any
gain on the disposition of such interest would be treated similarly. 243 An investment services partnership interest is defined as
any interest in a partnership which is held by a person that provides, in the conduct of a trade or business, a substantial quantity
of certain investment advising or management services, services
stone initial public offering, structured very carefully to permit the publicly traded entity to
avoid corporate taxation, has drawn much criticism. See Fleischer, supra note 239, at 9-13,
17 (describing the Blackstone initial public offering and the use of a blocker entity to
cleanse income and tax receivable agreement that shifts certain tax benefits to the selling
shareholders). Corporations do not enjoy a capital gain tax preference. The Senate bill does
not address the broader issue of the tax treatment of carried interests.
Consequently, its passage would serve as a disincentive for funds to go public. Publicly
traded funds would provide small investors access to the active management that such
funds provide. Small investors are generally limited in their investment options to more
passive types of investment vehicles such as mutual funds. See id. at 32-35. The bill has
been subject to criticism on other grounds as well. As the Blackstone structure illustrates,
it is possible for the corporate tax burden to be borne by the public participants but not the
principals of the management firm. Moreover, the bill's narrow focus can be viewed as
directed at a particular firm-termed the '"ill of attainder" effect by Professor Fleischer.
See id. at 32.
241. See Taxation of CarriedInterests, supra note 30, at 7. A capital gains preference is
supported for other reasons as well. Tax favored status for capital gains reduces the 'lockin" effect that inhibits the transfer of such assets. The 'lock-in" effect is the propensity for
holders of appreciated assets to avoid selling such assets because of the tax liability that
would arise on the disposition of the appreciated assets. The ability to hold assets until
death and completely avoid income taxation exacerbates such an effect. See I.R.C. § 1014
(2006). Moreover, such a preference also mitigates the failure to index capital assets for
inflation. An analysis of whether capital gains should be treated preferentially is beyond
the scope of this work. See RICHARD A. POSER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW, 469-72 (Little,
Brown & Co. 3d ed. 1986); Alan J. Auerbach, How to Tax Capital Gains, WALL ST. J., Aug.
16, 2007, at A10.
242. H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. § 1(a) (2007) (adding § 710 to the I.R.C.). The bill also provides that losses with respect to such interests would be ordinary losses to the extent of
previously recognized income. Unused losses would be carried over to succeeding taxable
years and would not reduce the partner's basis in her partnership interest. Id. Apparently,
the United States is not alone in seeking to take a bigger tax bite out of fund managers.
See, e.g., U.K. Plans to Raise Income Taxes on Private-EquityManagers, WALL ST. J., Oct.
10, 2007, at A6.
243. H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. § 1(a) (2007). In effect, the bill would treat such partnership
interests similarly to certain self-created assets that are denied capital asset treatment.
See I.R.C. § 1221(a)(3)(A) (2006) (denying capital asset status for copyrights, literary, musical, or artistic compositions, letters, or memorandums if the taxpayer's personal efforts
created such property).
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with respect to arrangement of financing, or activities that support such services. 244 Income that is reasonably allocable to invested capital is not subject to ordinary income characterization.

245

H.R. 2834 is a recharacterization provision. Technically, it does
not treat the income earned from the carried interest as compensation in the true sense of such term. This is because it merely
recharacterizes capital gain income instead of treating the income
as direct compensation with a concomitant compensation deduction to the partnership. Consequently, the bill would place such
partnerships at a disadvantage in comparison to entities that
compensate for services rendered in a more traditional form.
For example, assume a partnership earns $1,000,000 in capital
gain income and allocates $200,000 of such income to a service
providing partner. Under the bill, the limited partners are allocated $800,000 of capital gain income and the service partner
$200,000 of ordinary income. If, on the other hand, the partnership employed a nonpartner and paid such person $200,000 for
her services, the limited partners would be allocated $1,000,000 of
capital gain and a $200,000 compensation deduction. Under the
bill, $200,000 of capital gain income disappears. This result is
anomalous because it is clear that capital gain has been generated. If the service partner traded for her own account, the gain
would be characterized as capital gain. If the service partner is
not allocated capital gain, it should be allocated to someone elseit should not disappear.
The treatment of all income allocable to the carried income as
ordinary income overtaxes the labor of the service providing partner because it fails to acknowledge that the profits interest is
property.246 The most vehement objection to taxing the profits
interest upon receipt is the double tax issue. 247 If a mechanism
were put in place to prevent the double taxation of the income allocable to the profits interest, much of the angst generated from
proposals to tax the profits interest upon receipt would disappear.
The valuation issue is more of a practical concern that, given the
ingenuity of the capital markets, would most likely be solved to
244. The bill's definition of an investment services partnership would cause the income
allocable to carried interests in real estate partnerships to be recharacterized. H.R. 2834,
110th Cong. § 1(a) (2007).
245. Likewise, any gain or loss on disposition attributable to invested capital would not
be recharacterized as ordinary income or loss. Id.
246. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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most everyone's satisfaction. At most, the service providing partner's income from services is the value of the profits interest upon
receipt. Any additional returns are from capital. The fact that the
profits interest was received for services is of no consequence.
Capital is often acquired as a result of an investment of labor. For
example, the grant of unrestricted stock to an executive is compensation at the time the stock is received, as is the grant of an
interest in real property to an independent contractor in exchange
for services. Appreciation in the stock or the real estate is not
taxed as compensation, but as a return on capital.
Support for taxing the entire income allocation attributable to a
carried interest is found by analogy to the tax treatment of nonqualified stock options. 248 However, there are two flaws in this
reasoning. First, the taxation of compensatory stock options is
itself flawed and overtaxes the labor component of the income.
Second, a profits interest in a partnership is fundamentally different than a stock option. A stock option is more akin to a compensatory option to acquire a capital interest in a partnership, the
taxation of which would closely approximate the taxation of such
stock options.
Compensatory stock options offer several benefits to both the recipient and grantor of the options. Compensatory stock options
provide the recipient with the benefits of tax deferral. In addition,
these instruments allow compensation to avoid the deductibility
limitation placed on executive compensation. 249 Nonqualified
stock options are subject to taxation in accordance with tax principles applicable to compensatory transfers of property in gen248. See, e.g., Taxation of Carried Interests, supra note 30, at 9; Fleischer, supra note
216, at 43.
249. I.R.C. § 162(m)(1)-(3) (2006) provides that publicly traded corporations may not
deduct compensation in excess of $1,000,000 paid to the chief executive officer or the four
highest paid officers other than the chief executive. However, this limitation does not apply
to performance-based compensation. Performance-based compensation is defined as any
renumeration payable solely on account of the attainment of one or more performance
goals. Id. § 162(m)(4)(C). Such performance goals must be determined ex ante, and certified ex post, by an independent compensation committee of the board of directors and approved by the shareholders. Id. § 162(m)(4)(C)(i)-(iii). The regulations interpreting this
provision provide that compensation attributable to stock options is deemed to be performance-based if, inter alia, the amount of compensation the employee could receive is based
solely on an increase in the value of the stock after the date of grant or award. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (1995). Therefore, at-the-money or out-of-the-money options are
considered performance-based while in-the-money options are not, and no distinction is
made between stock appreciation caused by market forces and firm-specific appreciation.
In effect, any appreciation in the stock is considered performance-based. Senator Carl
Levin has introduced legislation that would subject nonqualified stock option compensation
to the $1,000,000 compensation limit. See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
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eral. 250 As previously discussed, these rules provide that the receipt of property in exchange for services is a taxable event at the
time the property so received is transferable by the recipient or
not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever occurs
earlier.251 The transferor of the property is entitled to a compensation deduction, equal to the amount includible in the income of
the recipient, at the time the recipient of the property recognizes
252
income.
Treasury regulations interpreting the application of § 83 to
compensatory stock options provide that the incidence of taxation
is postponed until such time that the option is exercised or is otherwise disposed of, provided that, at the time the option is
granted, it has no readily ascertainable fair market value. 253 For
this purpose, an option has an ascertainable fair market value if it
is either actively traded on an established market or is transferable by the option holder, is immediately exercisable, and the underlying property that is the subject of the option is subject to no
restriction that has a significant effect on such property's value. It
is unusual for compensatory options to be either the subject of active trading or transferable.
Section 83 provides symmetry between the timing and amount
of the employee's income inclusion and the timing and amount of
the employer's deduction. Therefore, the benefit of the employee's
250. The extent of the relative deferral and conversion benefits enjoyed by recipients of
compensatory stock options vary depending on whether the options are qualified or nonqualified. Qualified stock options are of two types-incentive stock options and those
granted pursuant to an employee stock purchase plan. The recipient of an incentive stock
option does not recognize taxable income upon either the grant of the option or its exercise.
Rather, the incidence of taxation is postponed until the option holder disposes of the stock
acquired through the exercise of the option, at which time the income is taxed at capital
gain rates. I.R.C. § 421(a)(1) (2006). Options granted pursuant to employee stock purchase
plans must, in general, be granted to all employees. See id. § 423(b)(4) (excepting employees employed less than two years, part-time employees, seasonal employees, and highly
compensated employees). Because of the requirements imposed on qualified stock options
these types of options are not a significant element in executive compensation schemes and
should not be compared with profits interests in partnerships. See Melone, supra note 57,
at 546-48. Note that the alternative minimum tax imposes a potential burden to incentive
stock option holders. Id. at 548.
251. See supranote 110 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. The transfer of appreciated or depreciated property by a service recipient will result in gain or loss on the transfer of such property determined as if the property were sold for its fair market value. This result will not
arise in the context of compensatory stock options because a corporation recognizes no gain
or loss on the transfer of its stock. See I.R.C. § 1032(a) (2006).
253. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a) (2004). The regulations make clear that the incidence of
taxation is postponed until the date of exercise even though the option's value is readily
ascertainable prior to exercise but after the date of grant.
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income deferral is offset by the deferral of the employer's deduction. Despite this fact, some deferral benefit survives. From the
employee's perspective, the advantage of tax deferral is equivalent
to an exemption from tax on investment earnings on the after-tax
compensation amount that would have been received had compensation not been deferred. 254 Stock options exaggerate this benefit
255
due to leverage inherent in such instruments.
The tax benefits available to the employee may be captured by
the employer or the government, or both. In a deferred compensation arrangement, the employer has freed up cash that otherwise
would have been used to compensate employees. The returns on
such cash may result in the imposition of tax that offsets most, if
not all, of the benefit enjoyed by the employee. For example, the
employer could invest the cash in its operations, thereby increasing its taxable income, or it may purchase its own shares or options on its own shares. In the latter case, the return on the invested cash is tax-free, causing the U.S. Treasury to bear the burden of the tax savings. 256 In such circumstances, the benefit inuring to the employee is borne entirely by the U.S. Treasury.
If the employer causes the employee to bear the entire cost of
the deferred deduction-the global contracting model-then the
only difference to the employee between the receipt of taxable
compensation and deferred compensation is the difference between the employee's after-tax rate of return and the employer's
after-tax rate of return. 257 For example, if personal tax rates are
254. See David I. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L. REV.
695, 709-10 (2005).
255. Tax deferral mimics the exemption of income on after-tax earnings. Therefore, the
benefits of tax deferral increase as the rate of return on investment increases. For example,
if an employee receives $1,000 in cash compensation she will retain, assuming a thirty
percent tax rate, $700. Assume that the $700 were invested in employer stock and held for
five years at which point the stock has doubled in value. Assuming a fifteen percent capital
gains tax the employee will be left with $1,295 (gross proceeds of $1,400 less capital gains
tax of $105). Alternatively, if the employee deferred the compensation for five years at
which time the amount deferred doubled in value then the employee would incur a tax of
$600 (thirty percent of $2,000), leaving the employee with $1,400. The difference between
the two amounts is the amount of the tax incurred on the gain that resulted from the investment purchased with after-tax dollars, or $105. Deferred compensation is disadvantageous during a period of falling asset values. See Walker, supra note 254, at 715-717 (noting that the disadvantages are mitigated by the limitations imposed on the use of capital
losses and the possibility that the terms of the stock option grant may be adjusted ex post).
256. See I.R.C. § 1032 (2006); Walker, supra note 254, at 727-30. Corporations with
significant net operating losses will also avoid tax on investment earnings, regardless of the
source of such earnings.
257. Professors Hall and Liebman of Harvard University analyzed the tax benefits of
deferral from a "global contracting" perspective. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The
Taxation of Executive Compensation,TAX POLY & ECON 1, 14 (2000) (attributing the term
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expected to decline or, due to personal idiosyncrasies, an executive
can time the exercise of options in a low tax year, the benefits of
the deferral will increase.
The deferral benefits that attach to compensatory stock options
are directly attributable to the fact that such options' value is not
ascertainable at the time of the grant. Consequently, the transaction remains open until such options are exercised, at which time
the resulting income is taxed as compensation. As a result, option
exercises often lead to extraordinarily large amounts of income to
the holders of options and equally large deductions to the grantor
corporation. 258 Proponents of taxing all income allocable to carried interests as ordinary income point to this result as support for
their position.
However, the determination that compensatory stock options
have no readily ascertainable value is a fiction. Similar arguments were made for years in support of accounting standards
that allowed corporations to issue options without recognizing
compensation expense. 259 The Financial Accounting Standards
Board has recently required compensatory options to be valued
upon issuance and expensed by the grantor corporation. 260 Recently introduced legislation would mandate that the employer's

"global contracting" to MYRON SCHOLES & MARK WOLFSON, TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY
(1992)). This perspective assumes that a corporation will hold its after-tax cost constant
and is, therefore, indifferent between paying compensation today or investing the compensation amount for a period and paying the compensation and the cumulative returns at the
end of such period. Assume that an executive could presently receive $1,000,000 in taxable
compensation, the executive's personal marginal tax rate is pt, and the corporation's marginal tax rate is ct. The executive's and the corporation's after-tax rate of return on investments is rp and rc, respectively. If the corporation pays the compensation currently its cost,
in present value terms, is the after-tax cost of the compensation, or $ 1,000,000 x (1-ct). If
the corporation defers payment its after-tax cost in n years is ($ 1,000,000 x (1+rc)n) x (1ct). In present value terms, however, the after tax cost is (($1,000,000 x (1+rc)n) x (1-ct)) +
(1+rc)n which is exactly the same as the cost of paying the compensation in taxable form or
$1,000,000 x (1-ct). For the executive, the difference between the amounts accumulated
after n years under each scenario is a function of the difference between the executive's
personal rate of return on investments and the rate of return earned by the corporation. An
executive that received $1,080,000 in current compensation would accumulate, in after-tax
dollars, $1,000,000 x (1-pt) x (1+rp)n after n years. Under the deferred compensation arrangement the amount that such executive would receive is $ 1,000,000 x (1-pt) x (1+rc)n.
258. Cisco Systems reported a tax benefit of approximately $2.5 billion for its fiscal year
ended July 2000 resulting from compensation deductions attributable to the exercise of

employee stock options. See Michelle Hanlon & Terry Shevlin, Accounting for Tax Benefits
of Employee Stock Options and Implicationsfor Research, 16 ACCT. HORIZONS 1, 1-2 (2002).
259. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 194.
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tax treatment of such options conform to their treatment for fi261
nancial accounting purposes.
A compensatory stock option is property that is acquired
through an investment in labor. The fact that a policy decision
has been made to tax such instruments upon exercise as compensation does not change the fact that the tax rules governing such
instruments overtaxes labor and undertaxes capital. 262 For example, assume a start-up company liberally grants compensatory
options to its employees, including a software engineer who receives a salary of $100,000 and a grant of 10,000 options with an
at-the-money strike price. This compensation policy could be the
result of an inability to compensate employees with cash at market rates or part of a concerted effort to attract talented employees. If the start-up company turns into the next Microsoft, Cisco,
or Google, the software engineer's options could be worth, at exercise, millions or tens of millions of dollars. It strains credulity that
this engineer's labor was worth such sums. The fact that stock
options are taxed in this fashion is no justification for taxing all
income generated by the carried income as compensation. Duplicating a flawed system for the sake of consistency is not good tax
policy. 263
Profits interests in a partnership should not be taxed similarly
to compensatory stock options even if one operates under the assumption that the tax treatment of the latter is doctrinally sound.
Profits interests are fundamentally different than stock options.

261. On September 28, 2007, Senator Carl Levin introduced legislation that would dramatically alter the tax consequences of compensatory stock options. Ending Corporate Tax
Favors for Stock Options Act, S. 2116, 110th Cong (2007). The bill would limit the corporation's tax deduction to the amount that the corporation reported as an expense for financial
reporting purposes. Moreover, the bill would subject compensation in the form of nonqualifled stock options to the $1,000,000 deduction limitation imposed by I.R.C. § 162(m). The
tax consequences to employees that receive nonqualified options would remain unchanged.
The bill would, therefore, eliminate the symmetry between employee income inclusion and
corporate deduction that exists under current law.
262. The symmetry provided by § 83 with respect to income inclusion and compensation
deduction mitigates the distortion by providing inflated compensation deductions to the
grantor of the options. This taxing scheme is often justified on the grounds that the tax
system should impose tax upon a realization event and that the issuance of an option is not
a realization event. Taxing options upon receipt also raises liquidity problems for the recipient. Liquidity problems, however, also exist upon exercise of options. In many cases an
option holder will have a portion of the shares received upon exercise in order to fund the
resultant tax liability. In any event, liquidity problems arise anytime property is exchanged for services.
263. See supra note 261 for a discussion of recently introduced legislation that would
conform the employer's compensation deduction related to nonqualified stock options to the
amount reported as an expense pursuant to financial accounting standards.
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An option holder does not own the equity interest that is the subject of the option until exercise. Such holder has no voting rights,
dividend rights, nor other rights that inure to the equity interests.
The owner of a profits interest in a partnership is a partner from
the time the interest is received. Such partner is entitled to her
share of partnership income at that time. A more apt analogy is
that the holder of a profits interest is in the position of an option
holder that has exercised her option upon receipt.
Assume that S, the service partner, receives a twenty percent
profits interest in a partnership and that the limited partners contributed $1,000,000 in capital. An option holder is not entitled to
any income until exercise. S, however, is fully entitled to her
share of the partnership's income from day one. Therefore, if S
has been granted an option, she has exercised it. S has been
granted an option to purchase twenty percent of partnership capital for $200,000. She has exercised that option. The $200,000 exercise price has been loaned to her on an interest-free basis by the
limited partners. No income would result from the option exercise
because the strike price equals the value of the capital purchased.
Any income generated by S as a result of this transaction is attributable to the interest-free loan. Consequently, we are back to
the below-market loan scenario.
The tax treatment of compensatory stock options would be mirrored by the grant of an option to purchase a twenty percent capital interest in the partnership. For example, instead of granting
S, in the above example, a twenty percent profits interest in the
partnership, she received an option to purchase a twenty percent
capital interest in the partnership that was exercisable within five
years. Assume that the value of the partnership's capital increased to $2,000,000 at the end of year three and that S exercises
the option. At that time, S would purchase a capital interest
worth $400,000 at the strike price of $200,000, resulting in
$200,000 of compensation. The partnership would be entitled to a
264
$200,000 compensation deduction at that time.
This result mirrors the treatment of compensatory stock options. During the three year interval between the issuance of the
option and its exercise, none of the partnership's income would be
264. Regulations have not been issued on the tax treatment of compensatory partnership
options. It is reasonable to assume that the treatment of such options would yield these
results particularly when examining the proposed regulations' treatment of capital shifts
attributable to the exercise of noncompensatory options. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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allocable to the option holder. The compensation income and deduction generated by the option exercise shifts the income attributable to the capital interest under the option and earned prior to
exercise from the limited partners to the service partner. The
holder of a profits interest would have already been taxed on the
income as it was earned by the partnership. The option holder's
income would be compensation and taxable at ordinary income
rates, as it should. The option holder did not earn any income
from the partnership until exercise at which time she received a
share of capital at a below-market price.
A profits interest is not an option. These interests carry different rights, duties, and entitlements. The fact that the economics
of one arrangement can be duplicated by the other is not remarkable. Many economic results can be duplicated, yet, depending on
the method chosen, widely disparate tax outcomes will result. For
instance, the effects of granting stock to an executive could be approximated by a cash bonus arrangement whose payout tracks the
performance of the stock. However, there is little dispute that the
holder of employer stock is entitled to capital gain treatment despite the fact that a cash bonus arrangement would result in compensation income. A stockholder is in a different position than the
holder of an unsecured contractual promise.
Likewise, the holder of a profits interest is in a different position
than the holder of an option on a capital interest. The fact that, in
the corporate context, any compensation inclusion is mirrored by a
corporate compensation deduction may explain the vehemence
directed at the taxation of carried interests. If all partners paid
tax at the same rate, then whether capital income was allocable to
the service partner or the limited partners would have no effect on
the overall tax liability of the combined partners. 265 However,
many limited partners are tax-exempt entities such as pension
funds and university endowments. In such cases, any tax benefits
of conversion are not offset by a tax detriment to the limited partners. Although this lack of balance between tax benefits and detriments can exist in a corporate employee-employer relationship,
its existence in a corporate setting is situational and not institu-

265. Under a "global contracting model" the tax benefits or burdens imposed on the
parties may be allocated contractually. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. The
passage of H.R. 2834 would result in an overall increase in tax because it would recharacterize the service partner's income as ordinary income without affecting the limited partner's income allocations. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
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tional. 266 This problem-if it is a problem-is inherent in many
relationships between a taxable entity and a tax exempt entity
and should not be an occasion to disturb well-established partnership tax principles. Perhaps the better approach would be to deal
squarely with the capital gain tax preference and not stealthily
attack the preference via Subchapter K.
IV. IS THE CARRIED INTEREST COMPENSATION?
A principled distinction between income from capital and income from labor has never been clearly made. We do not tax
"sweat equity" as labor income, nor do we tax endowment or human potential. 267 Much of the income that is generally thought of
as capital is, in reality, a combination of labor and capital. No attempt is made to bifurcate the income of the individual investor
who pores over market research and achieves superior returns.
Likewise, we do not impute a labor component to the fortunes
made by entrepreneurs such as Bill Gates or Steve Jobs, despite
the fact that the growth of their capital has been due, in significant part, to their labor.
In addition to providing the potential for income conversion, the
failure to impute a labor component to "sweat equity" places the
person doing the sweating at an advantageous position because
she is able to invest the fruits of her labor in pre-tax dollars. 268
Arguably, the same could be said for capital providers. A capital
provider is not imputed a risk-free return on her capital. For example, a stockholder's entire gain on the sale of stock is capital,
including returns that could have been achieved in risk-free
treasuries. In certain situations, such as stock options or returns
earned in traditional qualified plans, capital income is taxed as
labor income as the price for tax deferral benefits. 269 Moreover, a
fundamental premise of partnership taxation is to tax the partners in a fashion similar to that in which they would have been
taxed had they undertaken their activities in their individual capacities. It is beyond dispute that had the investment income
been earned directly by the service partner, the income would
266. A corporation with significant net operating losses would lose little, if any, from a
deferred tax deduction in comparison with the benefits to the employee of income deferral.
267. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
268. See Fleischer, supra note 216, at 34-39.
269. Participants in qualified plans, such as 401(k) plans, and other retirement accounts
such as IRAs, are taxed at ordinary income rates on distributions from such plan regardless
of whether the returns from investments in the plan were capital in nature.
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have been capital in nature, despite the fact that numerous labor
intensive activities are performed in generating such income.
Critics of the current tax treatment of carried interests do not
call for a broad-based effort to identify the labor component in the
myriad situations in which it is embedded in capital income. Nor
do they assert that the particular duties performed by the service
partners in a fund disqualify the income as capital because the
same duties are performed by individual investors without a similar fuss being raised. 270 Apparently, the heart of the matter is
that the service partner is working for someone else.
To be sure, the service partner labors, but for whom? In a corporate context, labor providers are either employees or independent contractors and, given that the corporation is an entity taxable
separately from its shareholders, all capital returns inure to the
corporation directly and to the shareholders indirectly. The service providers work for the corporation, and the character of the
corporation's income is irrelevant to the determination of the
character of the employee's income. Persons providing services to
partnerships, on the other hand, may be employees, independent
contractors, or partners. Partners do not work for anyone. The
rules of partnership taxation are "intended to permit taxpayers to
conduct joint business (including investment) activities through a
flexible economic arrangement without incurring an entity level
tax."2 71 This intent is carried out through the operation of various
mechanisms that prevent double taxation, even if such double
taxation is temporary. 272
The distinction in tax treatment between a partner and employee is clear in the tax law. If the service partner is, in substance, an employee, Subchapter K contains adequate provisions
for taxing the arrangement in an appropriate fashion. 273 To the
270. One critic has asserted that the capital gain preference arises because an entity
theory is applied to characterize the income. That is, the income is capital gain to the partnership but not to the service partner. See How to Tax CarriedInterests, supra note 238, at
4. However, the very same income would be capital gain to the partners had they generated such income in an individual capacity. The existence of the partnership as an intermediary should not affect the income's character nor does it under current law.
271. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a) (1995).
272. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 734, 743 (2006) (permitting the partnership to adjust the basis of
its assets in certain distribution transactions and upon the purchase of an interest by a
partner from another partner).
273. See, e.g., supra notes 86 and 99 and accompanying text. Investment banks have
begun to use the partnership structure to compensate their employees through the use of
carried interests in "side" funds. See Fleischer, supra note 216, at 20 n.72. If the so-called
partners in these funds remain, in substance, employees of the banks, then the income
generated from the carried interest should be taxes as compensation.

Spring 2008

Taxation of Carried Interests

489

best of the author's knowledge, the I.R.S. has not challenged the
status of fund managers as partners. 274 Nor is the tax law unique
in distinguishing between partners and employees. Tort law, antidiscrimination statutes, and bankruptcy laws make similar distinctions. 275 It is ironic that the income that is sought to be recharacterized is generated by the general partner, the very person
whose duties least resemble an employee. An answer to the following question is instructive: Who pays the service partner? No
one pays her because the service partner earns her own keep by
generating returns. The use of other persons' capital in generating
such returns transforms the capital providers into employers no
more than it does a banker who lends funds to others.
For the vast majority of service providers, including partners in
law firms and other professional partnerships, the present model
works just fine because the character of the income remains the
same regardless of whether such income is generated as direct
compensation or as a distributive share of partnership profits.
When the distributive share of income is capital in nature, critics
of the current tax treatment of the income attributable to carried
interests presume that the corporate employer-employee model is
a baseline from which departures must be justified. The partners
are certainly entitled to structure the fund manager's return as
contractual compensation that mirrors the returns that would be
generated from a carried interest. One can also assume that such
274. Whether a person is a partner or an employee or independent contractor is a factual
matter. The United States Supreme Court refused to establish a set of specific criteria and
placed particular importance on the intent of the parties. The court held that all the facts
including "the agreement, the conduct of the parties in execution of its provisions, their
statements, the testimony of disinterested persons, the relationship of the parties, their
respective abilities and capital contributions, the actual control of income and the purposes
for which it used, and any other facts throwing light on their true intent..." determine
whether a partnership exists. Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949). A very important factor in distinguishing between a partner and non-partner service provider is that
the former has the right to participate in the overall management and control of the enterprise. Employees are subservient to the employer. See James v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 930
(1951).
275. For example, the doctrine of respondeat superior imposes vicarious liability on
employers for torts committed by employees in the scope of their employment. See generally RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY 2d §§ 219(1); 229 (1957). Bankruptcy law grants favorable
priority to certain employees' claims for wages and claims of employee benefit plans. See 11
U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)-(5) (2006). Federal antidiscrimination statutes, such as Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age discrimination in Employment Act protect employees
against discrimination by employers. See generally Stephanie M. Greene & Christine NeyIon O'Brien, Partnersand Shareholders as Covered Employees Under Federal Discrimina.
tion Acts, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 781 (2003) (discussing the ability of partners and shareholders
to bring suit under the antidiscrimination statutes if the courts find that such persons are
not in a position of management or control of the entity).
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a contractual relationship does not alter the managerial and fiduciary aspects of the parties' relationship. Compensation earned
under such an arrangement would be ordinary income. However,
the author fails to see how this result more accurately reflects
economic reality than does the current tax regime. Capital gains
are generated. Based on what principle are the capital providers
entitled to all the capital gains?
The capital contributing partners have given the service partner
nothing more than raw capital. No infrastructure, goodwill, knowhow, workforce in place, or other support is provided. Instead, it is
the service provider that brings these items to the arrangement.
But for the service provider, there is no firm or anything else resembling an on-going business. Contrast this arrangement to the
newly admitted law firm partner who, in generating her income,
has at her disposal the reputation of the firm and a wellestablished infrastructure.
Professor Fleischer makes the point that the pooling of labor
and capital encouraged by the partnership form was not intended
276
to encompass partnerships holding such vast pools of capital.
However, the manner in which income is taxed is either principled
or it is not. Whether the amount of such income is $10 or $10 billion is irrelevant. The nature of the relationship in question is
described quite nicely by Ayn Rand, through the character Hank
Reardon, when, in defense of his life's work, he describes his relationship with his customers by stating:
I work for nothing but my own profit .... I do not produce ...
for their benefit at the expense of mine, and they do not buy..
• for my benefit at the expense of theirs; I do not sacrifice my
interests to them nor do they sacrifice theirs to me; we deal as
equals by mutual consent to mutual advantage-and I am
proud of every penny that I have earned in this manner...
277

V. CONCLUSION
The hue and cry for reform is directed at Wall Street. Fund
managers make inviting targets for public scorn. The profits
earned by some fund managers are embarrassing and these profits
276. Fleischer, supra note 216, at 27.
277. David Kelly, Capitalist Heroes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2007, at A21 (quoting from
AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED (Random House 1957) (emphasis added)).
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too often manifest themselves in lifestyles that reek of gilded-age
extravagance. However, these facts should not drive policy. Profits interests have been compared to below-market loans and compensatory stock options. They are neither. Skepticism should
heighten when something is described as resembling more than
one thing, for that usually means it is neither of the things it purportedly resembles. Investment funds represent the classic symbiosis of talent and capital for which Subchapter K was designed.
The taxation of the carried interest should remain undisturbed.
The perceived horizontal inequity of the current system is a result
of the capital gain preference and not the exploitation of some sort
of tax loophole. Whether, and to what extent, preferential treatment should exist for capital gains is a different issue entirely.

